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ABSTRACT 
Geographic Distance and the Impact of Investor Sentiment on Stock Prices 
 
by 
YANG Yan 
Master of Philosophy 
Based on China’s stock market, this study investigates how firms’ geographic distance 
from a financial center affects the sensitivity of stock prices to investor sentiment. I 
find that firms located closer to a financial center are more affected by investor 
sentiment than firms located far from a financial center. This distance effect holds for 
different geographic cutting boundaries and after excluding firms located in financial 
centers. Besides, using China’s High Speed Railway (HSR) as an exogenous shock, I 
find that HSR connection significantly decreases the effect of geographic distance on 
the sentiment-driven stock price relationship. In addition, firms with shorter travel 
times to financial centers are more affected by investor sentiment than firms with 
longer travel times. Moreover, firms located in provinces with a high stock market 
participation rate are more affected by investor sentiment than other firms. And 
Analysts increase the frequency of favorable recommendations for firms that are 
located closer to financial centers when investor sentiment is high. Furthermore, firms 
located closer to a financial center do not have higher institutional ownership than 
other firms. Last but not least, firms located in more economically developed provinces 
are not more affected by investor sentiment than firms located in less developed 
provinces. Overall, my findings highlight the importance of geographic distance in 
explaining the effects of investor sentiment on stock prices. 
  
 
DECLARATION 
       
I declare that this is an original work based primarily on my own research, and 
I warrant that all citations of previous research, published or unpublished, have been 
duly acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
                                        YANG Yan 
                                        Date    
  
 
  

  
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction ……………………………………………...….…………...1 
 
Chapter 2. Research Background 
2.1. Investor sentiment and asset valuation .....………………..……………... 15 
2.2. Firm location and asset pricing....................................................................18 
2.3. Geographic distance and information asymmetry ......................................19 
2.4. Geographic distance, familiarity and social 
interaction ………..…………………………………………....................................20 
2.5. Investor sentiment and sell-side analysts ………..……..............................22 
2.6. Institutional background and geographic distribution in 
China …………………………………………………………………..……............24 
 
Chapter 3. Hypothesis Development and Empirical Results 
3.1. Proximity and sentiment effect: more information or more behavioral 
bias...….......................................................................................................................27 
3.2. Construct and validate the investor sentiment index in Chinese stock 
market ………………………………………………………………………………30 
3.2.1. Construct the investor sentiment index in Chinese stock 
market ……………………………………………………………………………....32 
3.2.2. Validate the investor sentiment index in Chinese stock 
market……………………………………………………………………………….35 
3.3 Empirical results 
3.3.1. Sample description and data source …………………………………….37 
3.3.2. Investor sentiment effect and distance ………………………………….37 
3.3.3. Chinese High Speed Railway reform as an exogenous 
shock……………..…..…...........................................................................................42 
3.3.4. Additional analysis 
3.3.4.1. Stock market participation and investor sentiment 
effect…………………………...................................................................................49 
3.3.4.2. Analyst recommendation number and investor 
sentiment  …………………………………………………………………………51 
3.3.4.3 Institutional ownership and investor 
sentiment …………………………………………………………………………...58 
3.3.4.4 Gross Domestic Product and investor sentiment 
effect ………………………………………………………………………………..59 
 
Chapter 4. Conclusion, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research ...…………..60 
 
References …………………………………………………………………………..94 
 
Appendix ……………………………………………………………………..……101 
 
  
ii 
 
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of investor sentiment data and control 
variables.....................................................................................................................62 
Table 2. Validation of the sentiment index and its relation with future stock 
returns……………………………………………………………………………….66 
Figure 1. Comparison of sentiment index ……………………………………….....67 
Table 3. Sample selection………………………………………………………...…68 
Table 4. Number of firms in each geographic portfolio ………................................69 
Table 5. Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect..……………………....70 
Table 6. Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect (excluding firms located 
in financial center)……………………………........................................................ 72 
Table 7. Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local firms and 
nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines……………………………………………..74 
Table 8. Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local firms and 
nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR lines.………………………………………….76 
Table 9. Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local firms and 
nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines for subsamples…….....................................78 
Table 10. Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local firms and 
nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR lines for subsamples.………………………....80 
Figure 2. Sentiment coefficients over time before and after HSR reform ………….82 
Table 11. Travel time and investor sentiment effect...................................................83 
Table 12. Stock market participation and investor sentiment effect…………………84                          
Table 13. Summary statistics of stock recommendations…………………………...86 
Table 14. Number of analyst recommendations and investor sentiment effect …….87                                             
Table 15. A comparison of institutional ownership…………………………………92 
Table 16. Gross Domestic Product and investor sentiment effect…………………..93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
 
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Michael Firth, who 
guided me to the academia and gave me courage in time of difficulties in the course of 
my research. He managed to come to my topic defense seminar even if he was suffered 
from cancer at that time. Soldiers pass away in the battlefield whereas scholars end up 
on the desk. His scholarly spirit never dies and will inhabit in my mind during my life.  
 
Besides, I dedicate my genuine thanks to my advisor Prof. Gao Jin for the continuous 
support of my Mphil study and life, for his patience and immense knowledge and for 
his encouragements when I doubt myself. His guidance helped me in all the time of 
my research and writing of this thesis.  
 
In addition to my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Prof. 
LO Wai Yee, Prof. Zou Hong, and Prof. Wong Man-lai, for their insightful comments, 
which incented me to widen my research from various perspectives. 
 
Furthermore, I wish to extend my appreciation to Prof. Li Jingyuan, Prof. Winnie Poon, 
Prof. Zhao Xiaofeng and seminar participants at two Lingnan University seminars for 
helpful comments on the thesis, and Ms. Clara Hui, Ms. Agnes Tsui, for their kind help 
during my studies.  
 
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my families and friends, especially my 
grandfather, YANG Mingcai, for his valuable life experience working as a teacher and 
my friend LI Xuan, for his academic supports to me in writing this thesis. 
 1 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The impact of investor sentiment on stock prices (hereafter the investor sentiment effect) 
has received increasing attention from scholars during the past decade. An increasing 
number of studies have documented that investor sentiment can affect stock prices, and 
periods of high sentiment should be followed by low future stock returns as the price 
reverts to its fundamental value (e.g., Brown and Cliff, 2005; Tetlock, 2007; Seybert and 
Yang, 2012; Da et al., 2015). Furthermore, some studies find cross-sectional variations 
in the investor sentiment effect, with a stronger effect for firms with greater subjectivity 
and that are difficult to value. Specifically, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) find that the 
investor sentiment effect is stronger for small, young, high-volatility, extreme-growth, 
distressed, unprofitable and non-dividend-paying stocks. Firth et al. (2015) argue that low 
corporate transparency limits the availability of objective firm-specific information to 
investors and consequently forces them to rely more on their subjective judgments in 
valuing corporate assets. Consistent with their expectation, they find that firms with low 
corporate transparency are more affected by investor sentiment than firms with high 
corporate transparency. This study adds to this important emerging literature by 
examining whether investor sentiment effects have a geographic component. Specifically, 
I examine whether the distance of a firm from financial centers (geographic proximity 
hereafter) influences the investor sentiment effect.  
 
The basic motivation of my study comes from the literature demonstrating that the 
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location of firms matters for equity pricing (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Hong et 
al., 2008; El Ghoul et al., 2013). For example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that 
local investor ownership of a firm is positively related to its future expected returns. 
Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find that firms headquartered in the same geographic area 
exhibit a strong degree of co-movement in stock returns and argue that the price formation 
in stock markets has a significant regional component. Two major explanations have been 
proposed to explain the geographic component of stock price formation. The first is the 
information perspective, which suggests that information regarding the value of corporate 
assets is regionally distributed and stock prices exhibit a regional pattern due to the 
incorporation of the regionally distributed information (e.g., Ivković and Weisbenner, 
2005; Anand et al., 2011; Kubick and Lockhart, 2016). The second explanation, based on 
cognitive bias, suggests that market participants feel more familiar with local firms than 
nonlocal firms, and such a divergence in familiarity may induce a regional pattern of stock 
prices (e.g., Huberman, 2001; Korniotis and Kumar, 2013). 
 
Building on previous research on investor sentiment and the geographic component of 
asset pricing, I investigate whether the location of a firm is also a determinant of the 
investor sentiment effect. Specifically, I examine whether the geographic distance of a 
firm from its financial center affects the sensitivity of stock prices to market-wide investor 
sentiment. I focus on the distance from a financial center because a financial center has a 
high concentration of financial institutions (including security firms, investment banks 
and mutual funds) and a high density of individual investors, which have important 
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implications for the regional distribution of information (e.g., Loughran and Schultz, 
2005; Loughran, 2007). Furthermore, the high concentration of financial market 
participants can facilitate social interactions between them, which may help to spread or 
intensify their cognitive biases. As I explain shortly, the effect of a firm’s proximity to a 
financial center on the investor sentiment effect is theoretically unclear and is therefore 
an important and interesting empirical issue for investigation. 
 
Specifically, I propose two competing hypotheses on the impact of geographic proximity 
on the investor sentiment effect. The first is the information perspective, which suggests 
that market participants tend to have more firm-specific information regarding firms 
located near a financial center than distant firms. First, investors can gather more hard 
information—information that is quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal 
ways, and with content that is independent of the collection process (Petersen, 2004)—
about firms located near a financial center than distant firms because sell-side analysts 
work for brokerage firms that are predominantly located near financial centers. As a result, 
analysts can issue more research reports on proximate firms than on distant firms. O’Brien 
and Tan (2015) offer evidence that analysts are 80% more likely to cover local firms than 
nonlocal ones. In addition, Cheng et al. (2016) find that analysts who conduct corporate 
site visits can acquire more firm-specific information and thus have greater forecast 
accuracy than other analysts. Second, market participants can also obtain more soft 
information—information that is difficult to completely summarize in a numeric score 
(Petersen, 2004)—on proximate firms than remote firms. For instance, they may directly 
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talk to the managers, suppliers and employees or directly observe the daily operations of 
local firms. They may also have personal ties with local firms’ executives. Furthermore, 
firms’ investment decisions may be influenced by the local media, of which local market 
participants are also more likely to be the audience (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; El 
Ghoul et al., 2013). To the extent that there is more accurate firm-specific soft and hard 
information on local firms than nonlocal firms, investors have more reliable information 
to draw on when investing in local firms. The availability of information is expected to 
reduce investors’ subjectivity in valuing local firms and reduce their reliance on investor 
sentiment.  
 
However, previous research documents that investors may tend to invest locally because 
they feel more comfortable investing in firms with which they are familiar but do not 
necessarily have more information about (the cogntive bias perspective) (e.g., Grinblatt 
and Keloharju 2001; Huberman 2001; Seasholes and Zhu 2010). As financial centers have 
a high concentration of financial institutions and individual investors and tend to be more 
familiar with local than nonlocal firms, firms that are closer to financial centers are more 
likely to be affected by familiarity-driven behavior. Furthermore, a high concentration of 
market participants also facilitates social interactions, which can facilitate exchanges of 
ideas and beliefs (Shiller et al., 1984). Previous research also shows that these social 
interactions can have important implications for investor behavior. For example, Hong et 
al. (2004) find that social interactions increase stock market participation. Han and 
Hirshleifer (2016) model how the bias toward sharing positive information induces more 
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trading. To the extent that market participants are more (less) likely to talk about firms 
they are familiar with when investor sentiment is high (low), I expect the perceived 
familiarity of local firms to increase (decrease) when investor sentiment is high (low). As 
a result, investors are more (less) likely to buy local firms than nonlocal firms when 
market sentiment is high (low), resulting in a stronger investor sentiment effect for local 
firms than nonlocal firms.  
 
To summarize, the information perspective predicts that the investor sentiment effect is 
weaker for local than for nonlocal firms, while the behavior argument proposes that the 
investor sentiment effect is stronger for local than for nonlocal firms.  
 
In this study, I aim to distinguish these two competing hypotheses using China’s stock 
market as my testing ground. China is the world’s largest emerging market, ranking 
second in terms of gross domestic product (GDP)1 and third in terms of geographic area.2 
China’s stock market is dominated by individual investors who lack experience with 
market downturns (Ng and Wu, 2006), which makes them more prone to optimism. The 
opportunities for short-selling and margin trading are very limited in China, which deters 
arbitragers from correcting for mispricing (Sharif et al., 2014). The level of corporate 
transparency is also low in China, which limits the possibility for investors to conduct 
objective evaluations of corporate assets and consequently intensifies the investor 
sentiment effect (Firth et al., 2015). As demonstrated by Firth et al. (2015), the investor 
                                                             
1 Second to the United States from 2010 and afterwards, according to the IMF. 
2 9,596,961 𝑘𝑚2, after Russia and Canada. 
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sentiment effect in China tends to be stronger (in terms of magnitude and duration) than 
those documented in mature markets. The presence of a significant investor sentiment 
effect in China makes it a particularly useful venue for investigating the determinants of 
the effect.  
 
China is a vast country with three well-known financial centers in Shanghai, Shenzhen 
and Beijing. China’s two stock exchanges are located in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Beijing, 
as the Chinese capital, has become the financial services regulatory center of China. It is 
also the headquarters of the financial regulatory authorities and the four national banks. 
As I show in the next section, these three financial centers in China have a high 
concentration of financial institutions and a vast investor base, making them a potential 
origin of information and a venue for social interactions.   
 
All initial public offerings (IPOs) in China must be approved by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Yang, 2013). The CSRC allocates the security licenses 
for firms regarding IPOs and while accounting for regional development; this creates a 
network of geographically distributed firms across the country and thus provides huge 
variations in geographic distance from firm headquarters to financial centers. 
  
More importantly, the introduction of the High Speed Railway (HSR) in China, the 
longest HSR system in the world, provides a valuable testing ground to conduct a 
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portfolio-based difference-in-difference analysis on whether the distance from financial 
centers really matters for the investor sentiment effect. The first HSR train was introduced 
on April 18, 2007.3 New lines have gradually been built across the country and the 
railway has become immensely popular, with an annual ridership of over 1.44 billion in 
2016.4 An HSR connection significantly reduces the travel time required for cross-city 
travel and has reduced the effective distance between connected cities and financial 
centers. Most importantly, the placement of HSR lines should be based on comprehensive 
consideration of the economic development, population and resource distribution, 
national security, environmental concerns and social stability of each region,5 which 
have nothing to do with the general market investor sentiment. Furthermore, HSR lines 
were introduced in different regions at different times, thus providing the valuable cross-
section variations in HSR connections required for a difference-in-difference analysis 
(firms connected to HSR and firms unconnected to HSR during our sample period). 
 
My investigation proceeds in two major steps. The first step is to construct the measure 
of investor sentiment and validate it. I follow the approach of Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
and Firth et al. (2015) in constructing the measure of market-level investor sentiment with 
seven variables: closed-end fund discounts, market turnover, the number of IPOs, the IPO 
first-day returns, the share of equity issues in new financing, the growth of investment 
                                                             
3 A trial line with a speed of 200 km/h opened in 2002 between Qinhuangdao and Shenyang and was upgraded to 
250 km/h in 2007. According to China’s Rail Safety Management Regulations initiated in 2014, HSR refers to 
railway lines running at an average speed of 250 km/h or more, or passenger-dedicated intercity lines running at an 
initial speed of 200 km/h or more.  
4 China Railway Yearbook 2016. 
5 Mid-to-Long Railway Plan, 2008, by the Ministry of Railway in China. 
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accounts and the growth of savings deposits. While following the same methods to 
construct the investor sentiment measures as used by Firth et al. (2015), I extend the 
sample period to the end of 2015. I also follow Firth et al. (2015) in validating the investor 
sentiment index in China’s stock market and find similar results. Specifically, I find that 
the investor sentiment index is negatively related to subsequent market returns from 5 
months onward, and this relation becomes significant at 11 months after, which is 
consistent with the investor sentiment effect in China’s stock market. 
 
I then compute the geographic distance between the headquarters of a firm and its relevant 
financial center. As mentioned, there are three financial centers in China— Shanghai, 
Shenzhen and Beijing. Specifically, firms that are headquartered within a certain radius 
of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen are considered as local firms, whereas firms that are 
headquartered outside the radius are considered nonlocal firms. Following previous 
studies (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Ivković and Weisbenner, 2005; Kang and 
Kim, 2008; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010), I consider radiuses of 250 miles, 100 miles and 
100 kilometers. To better investigate the difference in the investor sentiment effect 
between local and nonlocal firms, I also compare the effect on firms located within a 
radius of 100 kilometers and firms outside a radius of 1,000 kilometers. As the investor 
sentiment effect becomes significant at 11 months and after, I focus on the horizons of 9, 
12 and 15 months.  
 
The second step is to conduct a regression analysis to discern the investor sentiment 
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effects. My investigation period ranges from January 2003 to December 2015 due to the 
lack of monthly trading accounts data before 2003. My investor sentiment composite 
index consists of 156 monthly observations, and the initial sample contains all 
nonfinancial firms listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen A-share stock exchanges. To 
examine the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices, I follow previous research in 
regressing future cumulative returns on sentiment and include control variables for each 
set of portfolios sorted by local versus nonlocal firms. I find consistent and significant 
evidence that local firms are more affected by investor sentiment than nonlocal firms, 
regardless of the criteria used to classify them as local versus nonlocal. The result is 
consistent with the cognitive bias perspective. This distance effect still holds after I 
eliminate firms headquartered right in the financial centers, suggesting that the results are 
driven not by financial centers but by the important role that geographic distance plays in 
the sentiment-driven stock price relationship. Furthermore, using China’s HSR as an 
exogenous shock, I find that the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices varies not 
only between local and nonlocal firms, but also in terms of HSR connection. Specifically, 
I divide firms into HSR-connected and HSR-unconnected groups. The distance effect 
holds in the circumstance that nonlocal firms stay unconnected to HSR during the sample 
period. In contrast, I observe the distance effect for the HSR-connected group before the 
connection, but it disappears once the HSR is in operation, which provides direct evidence 
that upgrading the transport infrastructure can mitigate the impact of geographic distance 
on the investor sentiment effect. Moreover, in order to mitigate the effect of aviation, I 
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restrict firms located within a radius of 1500 kilometers6 and conduct the difference-in-
difference analysis again to clarify the effect of HSR lines. The results are still holds. 
Furthermore, I divide firms into local and nonlocal firms according to the travel times 
(including railway, airline and toll road) and find that firms with less travel times to a 
financial center are more affected by investor sentiment than their counterparts, 
suggesting that the time cost of inter-city travel is an important consideration for financial 
market participants.  
 
In addition, I try to seek additional evidence for the distance effect. First, I provide 
evidence that investor concentration matters for the distance effect. I find that among 
firms headquartered in the province, the three top-ranking firms in terms of stock market 
participation are more affected by investor sentiment than the other firms, which supports 
the notion that the concentration of individual investors matters for the investor sentiment 
effect.   
 
Second, a huge strand of the literature documents that sell-side analysts show an 
optimistic bias in their earnings forecasts or stock recommendations and attribute it to 
their strategic behavior or cognitive bias (e.g., Brown, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; 
Qian, 2009; Firth et al., 2013). Moreover, investor sentiment may affect analysts. Bagnoli 
et al. (2009) show that analysts pay attention to investor sentiment when issuing stock 
recommendations. Hribar and McInnis (2012) find that analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
                                                             
6“We believe HSR is not so competitive for distances over 1,500 kilometers” from Morgan Stanley Report “China 
High-Speed Rail” May 15, 2011. 
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more optimistic during periods with high market-wide sentiment. Corredor et al. 
(2014) confirm the cognitive bias in analyst forecasts with the finding that investor 
sentiment is positively and significantly related to analyst forecast errors in European 
markets. Consistent with this strand of literature, I find that analysts cover more local than 
nonlocal firms given the convenience of time and transportation costs. When investor 
sentiment is high, analysts issue more “Strong buy” or “Buy” recommendations. On 
average, local firms have 37 more “Strong buy” recommendations and 24 more “Buy” 
recommendations than nonlocal firms each quarter. Most importantly, analysts increase 
the frequency of favorable recommendations for local firms when investor sentiment is 
high. The results suggest that financial analysts tend to be more optimistic about local 
firms than nonlocal firms when investor sentiment is high, which may also drive the 
documented distance effect. 
 
Furthermore, I provide evidence that there exists no difference between local and nonlocal 
firms in terms of institutional ownership, which helps to rule out the possibility that the 
geographic component in the sentiment-driven stock price relationship is induced by 
institutional investors and it further supports the notion that the geographically-distributed 
retail investors who are relatively inexperienced and more prone to market sentiment than 
institutional investors drive our main result. 
 
Last but not least, I also offer evidence that the relation between geographic distance and 
the investor sentiment effect is not driven by strong economic performance and a good 
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market environment. Specifically, there is no significant difference in the investor 
sentiment effect between firms headquartered in provinces with high GDP and firms 
located in other provinces, even after excluding firms located right in the financial center.  
 
These results address the endogeneity concern and support the notion that a geographic 
component exists in the sentiment-driven stock price relationship.  
 
My studies contribute to the literature on the investor sentiment effect by adding an 
important geographic component. Unlike studies that focus on firm fundamental and 
corporate transparency in driving the sentiment effect, my study offers evidence that 
geographic distance from a firm’s headquarters to its financial center can help to explain 
the sensitivity of stock prices to investor sentiment. Studies of the investor sentiment 
effect tend to construct a market-wide sentiment index for a stock market or a country. 
The geographic difference in the investor sentiment effect documented here raises the 
question of whether a regionally based sentiment index may be more relevant for 
investigating this effect in a large country such as China. This is an important issue for 
further research.  
 
My study also contributes to the literature on the role of geographic distance in financial 
markets in two ways. First, studies have predominantly focused on mature markets such 
as those in the U.S. and other developed countries (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; 
Butler, 2008; Almazan et al., 2010; John et al., 2011). Fewer studies have been conducted 
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on emerging markets where the development of financial markets (such as corporate 
governance, the information environment, investor protection, and education) and the 
investor base (with predominantly inexperienced retail investors), are vastly different 
from those of developed markets (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003). I focus on 
the world’s largest emerging market and obtain evidence that is consistent with the salient 
characteristics of emerging markets. Second, my study also adds to the line of studies 
attempting to identify and distinguish the mechanisms underlying the geographic patterns 
of stock prices (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Anand et al., 
2011). By focusing on whether geographic proximity mitigates or intensifies investor 
sentiment effects, my study offers new evidence that the geographic pattern is driven by 
cognitive bias rather than information.  
 
In addition to academic value, my study has policy implications and practical relevance 
for investors. Regarding the policy implications, for a large country such as China, the 
issue of whether to have just a few large financial centers or a network of decentralized 
financial centers has been intensively debated. My findings show that the existence of 
several large financial centers with a high concentration of financial institutions and 
investors may fuel the investor sentiment effect, especially in the context of an emerging 
market. They also show that investment in transportation infrastructure can help to reduce 
the effective distance and mitigate the investor sentiment effect.  
 
Regarding practical relevance, my findings suggest that investors can make use of the 
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geographical component in investor sentiment effect to formulate their investment 
decisions. For example, investors can ride the sentiment effect by tilting their portfolios 
toward local stocks in the early stage of the high investor sentiment period and short-sell 
them in the later stage.  
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Chapter 2. Research background 
 
Studies have documented that investor sentiment affects stock returns, although classical 
financial theory argues that rational arbitrageurs could bet against the risk of noise traders 
and correct for the mispricing they induce (e.g., Fama, 1965; Black,1986; Brown and 
Cliff, 2005). A branch of the literature also offers evidence that the location of firms plays 
an important role in stock pricing (e.g., Anand et al., 2011; Garcia and Norli, 2012). While 
a firm’s fundamentals and corporate transparency could explain the sensitivity of stock 
prices to investor sentiment (e.g., Baker and Wurlger, 2006; Firth et al., 2014), little 
attention has been paid to the location of the firm in the sentiment-driven stock price 
relationship. In this study, I investigate the influence of geographic distance on the 
sentiment-driven stock price relationship.   
 
2.1. Investor sentiment and asset valuation 
 
Investor sentiment, also known as “noise trader sentiment,” “the propensity of speculation” 
or “the optimism or pessimism about the overall stock market,” refers to the unpredictable 
opinions of noise traders about asset returns that are not warranted by fundamentals (De 
Long et al., 1990, hereafter DSSW; Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Classical financial theories 
argue that noise traders who make destabilizing speculations always lose money to 
rational arbitrageurs and will finally disappear from the financial market (Friedman 1953). 
However, DSSW (1990) refute that noise traders’ beliefs may not revert to their mean 
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over a longer period and may become more extreme in the meantime, and hence that 
rational arbitrageurs lose money by trading against noise traders. As risk-averse 
arbitrageurs have reasonably short horizons, their willingness to arbitrage is limited. 
DSSW (1990) further argue that the unpredictability in noise traders’ opinions of future 
stock prices deter arbitrage and affect prices even when there is no fundamental risk. 
 
A large strand of the literature documents that investor sentiment can affect stock prices. 
Lee et al. (1991) suggest that the fluctuations in closed-end fund discounts are driven by 
changes in investor sentiment because the optimism or pessimism of individual investors 
affects the prices of underlying securities. Barberis et al. (1998 ) model investor sentiment 
and point out that conservatism and the representative heuristic make investors underreact 
and overreact to news, respectively. Using the number of “bullish,” “bearish” or “neutral” 
newsletters to measure investor sentiment, Brown and Cliff (2005) provide evidence that 
investor sentiment drives stock prices to deviate from their fundamental values. When 
beginning-of-period investor sentiment is high, future stock returns are low as the stock 
price reverts to its fundamental value and vice versa. This investor sentiment effect 
changes according to the subjectivity of the valuation, limits on arbitrage, short-sale 
constraints and corporate information environment. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) 
construct a market-level investor sentiment index and offer systematic evidence that 
investor sentiment can affect the cross-section of stock returns. Specifically, they suggest 
that stocks that are hard to value and difficult to arbitrage are more vulnerable to investor 
sentiment, and empirically document that small, young, high-volatility, unprofitable, non-
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dividend-paying, extreme-growth and distressed stocks are affected more by investor 
sentiment. Stambaugh et al. (2012) suggest that the short-sale constraints contribute to 
overpricing when market-wide sentiment is high by exploring 11 asset pricing anomalies. 
Firth et al. (2015) demonstrate that firms with higher corporate transparency, measured 
by a bunch of variables including state ownership, the prevalence of related party 
transactions, accrual-based earnings management, audit opinions and the quality of audit 
firms are less affected by investor sentiment than firms with low corporate transparency. 
Cornell et al. (2014) further argue that high-quality accounting information reduces 
sentiment-related mispricing.  
 
More recent studies seek new ways to measure investor sentiment. For example, Arif and 
Lee (2014) argue that aggregate corporate investment is an alternative measure of market-
level investor sentiment. Da et al. (2015) suggest that households’ daily Internet search 
volume can reveal market level investor sentiment. Aboody et al. (2016) offer empirical 
evidence that overnight stock returns have the same characteristics as the existing 
sentiment measure and propose that they could measure firm-specific investor sentiment. 
I follow the approach of Baker and Wurlger (2006) in constructing the market-level 
investor sentiment index for two reasons. First, the sentiment index produced by Baker 
and Wurgler is the most widely used to date (e.g., McLean and Zhao, 2014; Antoniou et 
al., 2015). Second, Firth et al. (2015) have already validated the index in the Chinese 
stock market by extending Baker and Wurlger’s (2006) approach. 
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2.2. Firm location and asset pricing  
 
The location of a firm matters for equity pricing. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) establish 
a geographic link between a fund investment and its performance. They find that fund 
managers earn substantial abnormal returns in their proximate investments and show that 
local investor ownership of a firm is positively related to its future expected returns after 
controlling for other factors that are known to capture a sizable portion of the cross-
sectional variation in stock returns. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) document a strong co-
movement in the stock returns of firms located in the same geographic area and argue that 
the price formation of the stock market has an important geographic component that is 
linked to the trading patterns of local residents. Hong et al. (2008) relate the stock price 
of a firm to the market conditions of its home locale by suggesting that the ratio of the 
aggregate book value of all firms headquartered in a certain region to the aggregate 
income of all households in the region has a negative effect on stock prices. Baik et al. 
(2010) find that both the level of and change in local institutional ownership predict future 
stock returns, and stocks in the local institutional investors’ portfolio can earn higher 
excess returns around future earnings announcements than their counterparts. Anand et 
al. (2011) explore the importance of geographic proximity between firms and market 
makers for price discovery in the NASDAQ stock market and find that geographically 
proximate market makers contribute more to the price discovery of a firm’s stock than 
distant market makers. Garcia and Norli (2012) show that firms with business activities 
concentrated in a small geographic area have higher returns than geographically dispersed 
 19 
 
firms. El Ghoul et al. (2013) provide robust evidence that firms located in nonfinancial 
centers exhibit a higher cost of equity capital than firms headquartered in financial centers. 
Kubick and Lockhart (2016) find that a firm’s proximity to a Securities Exchange 
Commission office influences the individual stock price crash risk. Overall, this branch 
of the literature highlights the importance of geography in asset pricing.  
 
2.3. Geographic distance and information asymmetry 
 
Another large strand of the literature demonstrates that geographic proximity helps to 
exploit local knowledge and gather information. As a result, being close can lower the 
level of information asymmetry between economic agents who possess a different 
information set. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) suggest that fund managers can earn 
abnormal returns on their geographically proximate investments with the help of their 
local information advantage. Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) argue that individual 
investors may find it easier to gather accurate value-relevant information on firms located 
close to them than on remote firms, and differentiate the “asymmetric information 
hypothesis” from the “familiarity hypothesis” by empirically documenting that proximate 
investments with value-relevant information can realize superior returns. Malloy 
(2005) finds that geographically proximate analysts are more accurate than other analysts 
because of their information advantage. Butler (2008) investigates municipal bond 
offerings and also finds that the comparative advantage of local investment banks is the 
most prominent for the most opaque issuers, which suggests that local underwriters have 
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easy access to specific information about issuers and thus can better evaluate them. Kang 
and Kim (2008) demonstrate that block acquirers who enjoy an information advantage 
(e.g., lower monitoring and time costs; more private and valuable information in terms of 
local targets) can perform better during the post-acquisition period. Baik et al. 
(2010) offer empirical evidence that the ownership of institutional investors can only 
predict future stock returns for local firms, and further highlight the informational 
advantages of local institutional investors. Bernile et al. (2015) suggest that geographical 
variation in firms’ economic activities generates location-based information asymmetry 
among investors, which in turn influences their portfolio decisions and performance. 
Overall, these findings confirm that geographic distance may measure the level of 
information asymmetry by showing that economic agents can obtain more accurate 
information as distance erodes.  
 
2.4. Geographic distance, familiarity and social interaction 
 
The basic assumption behind the asymmetric information hypothesis 7  is that the 
information disseminated near proximate regions is accurate and authentic. However, 
geographic proximity also exposes stocks to a wide variety of individual and institutional 
characteristics in certain regions at the same time. Specifically, physical proximity also 
facilitates social interactions and the transmission of sentiment and non-market 
information (Pirinsky and Wang, 2010). Another growing area of the literature suggests 
                                                             
7 The hypothesis that geographic distance could measure the level of information asymmetry. 
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that investors’ preference for local investments is driven by a behavioral bias that makes 
them feel more comfortable investing in firms with which they are familiar. Based on a 
series of behavioral experiments, Heath and Tversky (1991) suggest that people prefer to 
bet on their own judgment in a context where they feel competent, and that this feeling is 
enhanced by familiarity and experience. They further argue that the reason investors with 
knowledge of diversification concentrate on a small number of firms is that investors 
regard themselves as capable of judging local investments. Using a Finnish dataset, 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) empirically document that a firm’s distance, language and 
culture are three important factors for investors’ local preference because these factors 
enhance familiarity. Huberman (2001) also suggests that familiarity represents investors’ 
belief that they currently have superior information or will obtain more information, and 
this familiarity drives their local investments. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) offer systematic 
empirical evidence that local investments do not generate abnormal returns and conclude 
that local preference is not driven by an information advantage. Korniotis and Kumar 
(2013) use a novel demographic-based proxy for smartness and find that “smart” 
investors have an information advantage while “dumb” investors reflect a psychological 
bias, such as overconfidence and sensation seeking, in their local investments. 
 
In addition, geographic proximity may promote social interactions, and the actions of a 
reference group can affect an individual’s preference (Horst and Scheinkman, 2006). 
Shiller (1984) suggests that investors’ behavior is socially influenced and argue that 
fluctuations in attitude often occur in the population and often without any apparent 
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logical reason. Hong et al. (2004) find that households that interact with their neighbors 
or attend church are substantially more likely to participate in the stock market than other 
households. They also document that a fund manager is more likely to hold a specific 
stock if other managers in the same city invest in this firm and point out that investors 
spread stock market information by word of mouth (Hong et al., 2005). Brown et al. 
(2008) also suggest that an individual’s investment decisions on stocks are affected by 
their neighbors via word-of-mouth. Baker et al. (2012) argue that social interaction is a 
mechanism used to spread sentiment. Han and Hirshleifer (2016) model how the bias 
toward sharing positive information induces more trading. These social interactions 
between financial market participants may increase the degree of familiarity and boost 
rumors, especially for unsophisticated individual investors who reveal cognitive bias.  
 
2.5. Investor sentiment and sell-side analysts 
 
Sell-side analysts play an important role in financial markets. They are in charge of 
synthesizing and disseminating information in capital markets, and investors with limited 
time or ability to analyze financial data often rely on analysts’ work (Bradshaw, 2011). 
However, analysts show an optimistic bias in earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations (e.g., Brown, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Qian, 2009; Firth et al., 
2013), even though an analyst is more likely to turn over if his or her forecast accuracy is 
lower than that of his or her peers (Mikhail et al.,1999). Strategic behavior or cognitive 
bias contributes to this optimistic bias. For strategic behavior, Lim (2001) argues that 
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analysts trade off positive bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy 
because unfavorable forecasts limit or eliminate analysts’ access to insiders. Hong and 
Kubik (2003) document that analysts who issue relatively optimistic forecasts are more 
likely to get favorable job separation, namely, moving upward in the hierarchy of 
brokerage firms because optimistic forecasts generate more trading and thus higher 
compensation for those analysts. In addition, Friesen and Weller (2006) model cognitive 
bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts and find both US and international evidence that 
analysts are overconfident about the precision of their own information and suffer from 
cognitive dissonance bias. Mokoaleli et al. (2009) also suggest that the new buy stock 
recommendations reflect both behavioral bias and conflicts of interest in analysts. 
 
In addition, analysts are affected by investor sentiment when they issue earnings forecasts 
and stock recommendations. Bagnoli et al. (2009) argue that analysts, who know that 
investor sentiment can affect stock prices, may consider both firm fundamentals and 
investor sentiment when making their recommendations. They provide empirical 
evidence that analysts pay attention to investor sentiment when issuing stock 
recommendations, and those that are positively correlated with investor sentiment tend to 
be less profitable. Hribar and McInnis (2012) suggest that analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
a direct measure of investors’ earnings expectations and offer evidence that their forecasts 
are more optimistic during periods with high market-wide investor sentiment for 
uncertain and hard-to-value firms. Corredor et al. (2014) confirm that both cognitive bias 
and strategic behavior exist in analyst forecasts and find that investor sentiment is 
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positively and significantly related to analyst forecast errors in European markets.  
 
2.6. Institutional background and geographic distribution in China  
 
China became the world’s second largest economy in terms of GDP in 2011 with 
persistent economic growth over the past 30 years. In addition, the Chinese stock market 
has grown exponentially to become the second largest in the world (after the United 
States).8 China has the third largest geographic area in the world, with three financial 
centers: Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing.  
 
Shanghai’s role as a predominant financial hub in the Asia Pacific region dates back to 
the 1930s. The first stock exchange market in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, was 
established in 1990 and has grown rapidly in the past decade. The Shanghai Stock 
Exchange provides a platform to raise capital for firms and offers investment 
opportunities for individuals. Shanghai also has a large urban economy and is a center for 
manufacturing and commerce.   
 
In addition, the Lujiazui Financial District9 and Shanghai Free Trade Zone10 offer strong 
policy-supported advantages for financial market development in Shanghai, and 
                                                             
8 As of March 2017, the total market value of the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges was US$7830.9 billion.  
9 The state council declared the opening of Lujiazui district in 1990; financial firms in this district enjoy special tax 
policies, incentives and support, including personnel training and expedited visa services.  
10 The state council launched the Shanghai Free Trade Zone in 2013. The zone cancels out a number of financial 
requirements for setting up a company in China and also introduces a simplified procedure for foreign investors to 
establish a company. 
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consequently, 445 multinational corporation (MNCs) had established regional 
headquarters there by 2013. Moreover, in the same year, Shanghai ranked first with 
respect to the total number of listed companies, listed H-shares companies, fund 
companies’ headquarters, security companies’ headquarters, total stock turnover value 
and so forth (Zhao et al., 2013).  
 
Shenzhen is positioned as a regional financial center according to “The Outline of the 
Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta” announced by the 
National Development and Reform Commission. The geographic proximity to Hong 
Kong provides Shenzhen with a good foundation of specialized manufacturing and 
finance. The small and medium enterprise (SME) board and the ChiNext 11  on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) give small but high-growth and high-tech companies 
opportunities to raise capital. The ChiNext board has become the world’s third largest 
market for growth enterprises and the largest among similar boards in Asia in terms of 
market capitalization and trade value (Zhao et al., 2013). Shenzhen also has a lot of 
investment and management companies, private equity and venture capital funds, which 
suits the needs of growing companies. Moreover, preferential government policies, 
including the establishment of Special Economic Zones and the Shenzhen-Hong Kong 
Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone in Qianhai, have attracted foreign direct 
investment to start businesses and set up headquarters in Shenzhen.  
 
                                                             
11 China’s NASDAQ-style stock market. 
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Beijing is considered a financial center in China, although it does not have a stock 
exchange. A financial street was established by the State Council according to the 1993 
Master Plan, and it was designed to host all regulatory agencies, including the central 
bank, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission and the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and headquarters of the 
big four state banks and non-banking enterprises (Chen and Chen, 2015). These financial 
regulatory organizations helped Beijing to become an information hinterland of financial 
policy and consequently attracted firms to become established there. Beijing’s total A-
share market capitalization ranked first in China and there are many large state-owned 
enterprises headquartered in Beijing. Beijing possesses the largest amount of A-share-
raised capital and the second largest number of listed companies and trading value in 
China (Zhao et al., 2013). Moreover, Beijing is quite strong in the bond market, banking 
industry, PE fund market and insurance market and thus is an ideal place for MNC 
headquarters.   
 
Overall, these three financial centers in China have a high concentration of financial 
institutions and a vast investor base, making them a potential origin of information and a 
venue for social interactions.  
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Chapter 3. Hypothesis Development and Empirical Results  
 
3.1. Proximity and sentiment effect: more information or more behavioral bias?  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that firms that are more difficult to value are more 
affected by investor sentiment. In line with this view, Firth et al. (2015) find that firms 
with low corporate transparency are more vulnerable to market sentiment than their 
counterparts. Considering that the location of a firm influences equity pricing (e.g., 
Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Garcia and Norli, 2012), it is plausible that a firm’s proximity 
to a financial center might also affect its valuation difficulty and thus influence the 
sentiment-driven stock price relation. Money managers, major brokerage firms and 
thousands of investors are sited predominately near urban metropolitan areas (Loughran, 
2007 ), especially in or near financial centers. Thus, a firm might be exposed to the 
general informational context or investors’ characteristics in or near the financial center.  
 
As discussed in the introduction, there are two competing hypotheses with regard to the 
impact of geographic distance on the investor sentiment effect. The first is the information 
hypothesis. Investors may obtain more value-relevant and firm-specific information on 
local firms than nonlocal firms. For a start, investors can easily access hard information 
on local firms. For instance, analysts who work for brokerage firms are more likely to 
cover local firms as the time and travel costs are low. O’Brien and Tan (2015 ) suggest 
that analysts are 80% more likely to cover IPO firms headquartered in their home states 
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than those in other states after controlling for industry specialization and underwriter 
status. Consequently, local firms are likely to have more frequent analyst forecasts, 
recommendations and reports than nonlocal ones. In addition, analysts who conduct 
corporate site visits can gather more firm-specific information and have greater forecast 
accuracy than other analysts (Cheng et al., 2016), which supports the notion that local 
firms have more hard information than do nonlocal firms. Furthermore, proximity offers 
an ideal channel for the collection of soft information. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010 ) 
find that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information and the firm-
bank distance drives a trade-off in the availability and pricing of credit. In a similar vein, 
John et al. (2011) argue that a firm’s distance from shareholders limits the observability 
of managerial investment decisions, thereby exacerbating agency costs and strengthening 
the need for dividend payouts in the presence of free cash flow. If geographic proximity 
facilitates the diffusion of firm-specific information (including both hard and soft 
information), firms with greater proximity to a financial center should face a lower level 
of information asymmetry. With less valuation difficulty and more information to rely on, 
external investors have lower monitoring and information-gathering costs for local than 
nonlocal firms. As a result, investors depend less on their subjective judgment when 
investing in local firms, which are then less affected by investor sentiment than nonlocal 
firms.  
 
The second hypothesis is based on the cognitive bias perspective. First, investors have a 
preference for firms they are familiar with. Huberman (2001) finds that clients of the 
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Regional Bell Operating Companies are much more likely to own stocks in the telephone 
company that provides their service than another telephone company, and argue that 
people prefer investing in the familiar. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) document that 
investors are more likely to hold, buy and sell the stocks of firms that are located close to 
them, communicate in their native tongue or have chief executives of the same cultural 
background. In addition, investors with limited cognitive ability may rely on familiarity 
as a screening device and therefore overweight familiar local stocks (Bernile et al., 2015). 
Huberman and Regev (2001) find that optimistic public attention induces a rise in the 
stock price of a biotechnology company even though no new information has been 
presented. Barber and Odean (2008) provide strong evidence that investors with scarce 
attention are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, including stocks that are in the news, 
are experiencing higher abnormal trading volume or have extreme one-day returns. I 
argue that investors who have limited attention may choose to invest in the familiar. 
Moreover, Seasholes and Zhu (2010) offer systematic empirical evidence that local 
portfolios do not generate abnormal returns, and purchases of local stocks significantly 
underperform sales of local stocks, suggesting that investors do not have value-relevant 
information about local stocks.  
 
Financial centers have a high concentration of market participants, who are more familiar 
with nearby firms than those located far away. As a result, local firms are expected to be 
more affected by the cognitive bias of familiarity than nonlocal firms. Furthermore, I 
expect the familiarity effect to be stronger (weaker) during a period of high investor 
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sentiment. Because market participants are more (less) likely to talk about firms for 
investment when market sentiment is high (low) and such social interactions may affect 
the behavior of the market participants. For example, financial analysts may be more (less) 
willing to cover local firms when investor sentiment is high (low) and individual investors 
are more (less) likely to buy local firms when investor sentiment is high (low). As 
documented by Hong et al. (2004), social interactions can boost stock market 
participation. Consequently, local firms may be more affected by investor sentiment than 
nonlocal firms.  
 
The influence of geographic proximity on the investor sentiment effect is therefore 
theoretically uncertain. Given that the information environment in China is poor and that 
various market participants (financial analysts and investors) are relatively inexperienced, 
I nevertheless formulate a hypothesis in favor of the cognitive bias perspective for 
empirical testing. The hypothesis is formally stated as follows. 
 
All else being equal, local firms are more affected by investor sentiment than nonlocal 
firms. 
 
3.2. Construction and validation of an investor sentiment index in the Chinese stock 
market 
 
I construct an investor sentiment index to examine the sentiment effect in the Chinese 
 31 
 
stock market. Baker and Wurgler (2006) develop an investor sentiment index using 
principal component analysis based on six underlying proxies for sentiment: closed-end 
fund discounts, market turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day returns on 
IPOs, the equity share of new issues and the dividend premium. Based on Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2006) work, Firth et al. (2015) form a component sentiment index in the 
Chinese stock market by considering another two underlying proxies for investor 
sentiment: the deposit savings growth rate and the number of new investment accounts. 
For the deposit savings growth rate, Firth et al. (2015) point out that Chinese investors 
allocate their money mainly between banks and equity markets because of the 
underdeveloped nature of financial markets and capital control in China. When investors 
become disappointed with the stock market, they aggressively switch their investments 
in equities to their traditional concentration in savings accounts. Burdekin and Redfern 
(2009) find that the rising stock market sentiment exerted a significant negative effect on 
time deposit growth in China during 2003-2007, which supports the argument of Firth et 
al. (2015). For the number of new investments accounts, they suggest that China’s stock 
market has a relatively short history compared with the developed financial markets, and 
that net inflows of new investors have entered the Chinese stock market in the last few 
decades. Due to their lack of investment experience and suffering during market 
downturns, investors may rely heavily on market sentiment rather than the rational 
calculation of firm fundamentals to participate in the stock market, especially in bull 
periods. Therefore, Firth et al. (2015) argue that the number of new investment accounts 
in the stock market may serve as a potential proxy for investor sentiment. In this paper, I 
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follow the approach used by both Baker and Wurlger (2006) and Firth et al. (2015) and 
construct a monthly investor sentiment index in the Chinese stock market from January 
2003 to December 2015.  
 
3.2.1. Construction of the investor sentiment index in the Chinese stock market 
 
Following Firth et al. (2015), I construct an investor sentiment index based on the 
variations of seven underlying proxies: the closed-end fund discount (CEFD), market 
turnover (TURN), the number of IPOs (NIPO) and their average first-day return (RIPO), 
the proportion of equity issues in the total issue of equity and long-term debt (Eshare), 
the deposit savings growth rate (DSG) and the number of new investment accounts 
(NACT). The first five variables are constructed in the same way as described by Baker 
and Wurlger (2006). Specifically, CEFD refers to the value-weighted average difference 
between the net asset value (NAV) per share and market price of each closed-end fund 
share, divided by the net asset value (NAV) per share. TURN is constructed as the natural 
log of the ratio of the amount of monthly market turnover trading to the aggregate market 
value, detrended by the 5-month moving average. NIPO is the number of IPOs and RIPO 
refers to the market-adjusted first-day returns. Eshare is the proportion of new equity 
issuance to total capital (total equity issuances plus bank borrowing) raised in a year. DSG 
is defined as the residual from the regression of the growth rate of seasonally adjusted 
deposit savings on the growth rate of M0. NACT is defined as the natural log of the 
number of new investment accounts. 
 33 
 
Following Baker and Wurlger (2006), I isolate the common component in the 
aforementioned seven proxies using principal component analysis, considering that each 
proxy is likely to include a sentiment-based and an idiosyncratic or non-sentiment-related 
component. As some proxies may take longer to reveal the same sentiment, I perform a 
factor analysis on all of the variables and their lags to determine the best lead-lag structure 
for each proxy. First, I estimate the first principal component of the seven proxies and 
their lags. This procedure produces a first-stage index with 14 loadings, one for each of 
the current and lagged proxies. I then calculate the correlation between the first-stage 
index and the current and lagged values of each proxy. Finally, I construct the sentiment 
index as the first principal component based on the correlation matrix of the seven proxies; 
I use the current or lagged value of the seven proxies, depending on which has a higher 
correlation with the first-stage index. I standardize the second-stage sentiment index so 
that the index has unit variance. The first principal component explains 37.37% of the 
sample variance, which is comparable with the explanatory power of the sentiment index 
reported in major developed countries (Baker et al., 2012). The correlation of the first- 
and second-stage indexes is 0.96, suggesting that little information is lost in dropping the 
seven proxies with other time scripts. The sentiment index is constructed as follows: 
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = −0.1207𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 0.5317𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 +  0.3607𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 +
0.1895𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡−1 + 0.4217𝐸𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 − 0.2844𝐷𝑆𝐺𝑡−1 + 0.5272𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑡−1        (1) 
 
As the variations of some proxies may have both a sentiment component and a business 
cycle component, I then construct a second index that explicitly removes the business 
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cycle variation from each of the proxies before the principal component analysis. 
Following Firth et al. (2015), I regress each of the seven raw proxies on the industrial 
production and consumption growth rates. The residuals labeled with a superscript ⊥ 
from these regressions are cleaner proxies for investor sentiment, and I construct the 
sentiment index following the same procedures as before. The corresponding first 
principal component explains 36.87% of the sample variance, which is still comparable 
with the explanatory powers of the sentiment index reported in major developed countries 
(Baker et al., 2012). The final investor sentiment index is constructed as follows: 
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡
⊥ = −0.0702𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑡
⊥ + 0.5174𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1
⊥ + 0.3134𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡
⊥ +
0.2115𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡−1
⊥ + 0.4482𝐸𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡
⊥ − 0.3352𝐷𝑆𝐺𝑡−1
⊥ + 0.5207𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑡−1
⊥        (2) 
 
Similar to the results of Firth et al. (2015), NACT has the highest loadings in the sentiment 
index and the factor loading on DSG is higher than those on CEFD, NIPO and RIPO, 
which indicates that both proxies are important for constructing an investor sentiment 
index in the Chinese stock market. Table 1 presents the summary statistics and 
correlations between the components of the sentiment index. All of the components are 
significantly correlated in the expected directions. When investor sentiment is high, the 
market trading volume moves up, the number of IPOs and the average first-day return of 
IPOs increase, the proportion of new equity issuances to total capital goes up and the 
number of new investment accounts soars, whereas the money-supply-adjusted deposit 
savings and the closed-end fund discount decrease. NACT and TURN are significantly 
correlated with every other component, consistent with the notion that NACT and TURN 
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make the largest contribution to the investor sentiment index. The correlations between 
the orthogonal variables only change slightly.  
 
3.2.2 Validation of the investor sentiment index in Chinese stock market 
 
To validate the investor sentiment index, I apply the same approach as Firth et al. (2015). 
Specifically, the general sentiment effect implies that if excessively optimistic sentiment 
drives the stock price up from its fundamental value, periods of high sentiment should be 
followed by low future stock returns as the stock price reverts back to its fundamental 
value. To investigate the sentiment effect, I regress the future excess market returns 
(𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘) on the sentiment index SENT and hypothesize that the coefficients of the 
sentiment index should be significantly negative. I compute 𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘 as the value-
weighted market returns minus the risk-free rate12 and cumulate it over various horizons 
from 1 to 24 months. Following the asset pricing literature (e.g., Brown and Cliff, 2005; 
Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006), I use macroeconomic variables as controls, namely, 
the contemporaneous market return (𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡), aggregate earnings-to-price ratio (𝐸𝑃𝑡), 
monthly interest rate (𝑅𝐹𝑡) and inflation rate (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑡). However, the investor sentiment 
index I construct is predetermined13 and not strictly exogenous,14 and the estimation on 
the lagged endogenous variables from the ordinary least squares regression is biased in 
finite samples (Stambaugh, 1999). In addition, the residuals from the regressions with 
                                                             
12 Measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed deposits. 
13 The past market sentiment affects current investor behavior but has little impact on future investor sentiment. For 
instance, a past financial crisis will lower the intention to invest in stock market now, but future financial growth or a 
hot market in the near future will not affect market-wide investor sentiment.  
14 The seven proxies for investor sentiment have an impact on stock returns.  
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overlapping observations can be serially correlated up to lag K-1 under both the null and 
alternative hypotheses, which fully account for time-varying expected returns 
(Swaminathan, 1996). To cope with these problems, I follow the approach of Nelson and 
Kim (1993) and Neal and Wheatley (1998) in testing significance by comparing the test 
statistics with their empirical distributions computed from randomization simulations. 
The regression model is as follows: 
∑ [𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘/𝐾] = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑅𝐹𝑡 +
𝐾
𝑘=1 𝛾4𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘                                                               
(3) 
 
where SENT refers to the investor sentiment index and 𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇  refers to the equal-
weighted market return over the risk-free rate. The summary statistics of SENT and other 
control variables are shown in Panel C of Table 1. Panel A of Table 2 presents the 
coefficients and simulation p-values from the time-series regressions of Equation (3). The 
coefficients on SENT decline monotonically up to the 12th month with a little rebound 
thereafter, and become significantly negative at a p-value of 0.05 or lower as the 
forecasting horizon extends to 11 months and beyond. Panel B of Table 2 illustrates the 
trend of the SENT coefficients over time. These results are similar to those of Firth et al. 
(2015)15 and validate the sentiment index as an important determinant of stock price. 
Furthermore, Figure 1 compares my investor sentiment index with that of Firth et al. 
(2015). The two sentiment index lines are almost overlapping from January 2003 to 
December 2009, providing direct evidence of the validity of the investor sentiment index 
                                                             
15 They document that the coefficients on SENT decline monotonically until the fourteenth month and become 
significantly negative at a p-value of 0.05 or lower as the forecasting horizon extends to 12 months and beyond. 
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in my study.   
 
3.3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.3.1. Sample description and data source 
 
Table 3 shows the sample selection procedures. The initial sample contains all of the firms 
that have been listed for at least three years on either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen A-
share exchanges (i.e., firms listed before the end of 2013). I exclude firms listed on the 
Growth Enterprise Market because they are relatively small. I also exclude financial firms 
and delisted firms. The final sample includes 2,058 firms listed on either the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen exchange market. I hand collect the addresses of firms’ headquarters and obtain 
longitude and latitude data at the prefecture level from Google map. My investigation 
period covers January 2003 to December 2015 and the investor sentiment index has 156 
monthly observations. All financial data and stock price data come from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.  
 
3.3.2. Distance and the investor sentiment effect 
 
I begin by examining the difference in investor sentiment effect between local and 
nonlocal firms. And I also exclude firms located exactly in financial centers and retest the 
main hypothesis to differentiate the effect of financial centers from the impact of 
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geographic distance in the sentiment-driven stock price relationship. Two mechanisms 
are related to this issue. First, if the empirical result is consistent with the information 
hypothesis, one may expect the relation between geographic distance and the investor 
sentiment effect to hold even when firms located in financial centers are excluded from 
our sample because information, especially soft information, may not be confined to the 
financial center. Second, if the result is in line with the behavioral bias perspective, the 
interaction between distance and the investor sentiment effect will not disappear. Social 
interactions and the degree of familiarity may not be confined to the financial center, and 
there may be some spillover of investor bias in nearby areas. In any case, the relation 
between proximity and investor sentiment still holds after excluding firms located in 
financial centers.  
 
I measure the geographic distance between a firm’s headquarter and the center of 
whichever financial center (Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen) is closest. Specifically, firms 
that are headquartered within a certain radius (250 miles, 100 miles and 100 kilometers) 
of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen are considered as local firms whereas firms that are 
headquartered outside the radius are considered nonlocal firms. I also compare the 
investor sentiment effect on firms located within a radius of 100 kilometers and firms 
outside the radius of 1,000 kilometers to offer clearer evidence of the difference in 
investor sentiment effect between local and nonlocal firms. While the investor sentiment 
effect becomes statistically significant from the 11-month horizon onwards, I focus on 
the time horizons of 9, 12 and 15 months to observe the association between sentiment 
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and subsequent returns. Following Brown and Cliff (2005), I investigate the sensitivity 
of stock prices to investor sentiment after controlling for the earnings-to-price ratio (EP), 
risk free rate (RF), inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB 
and HML). The regression model is as follows: 
∑ 𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝛾6𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘                                             (4) 
 
where ∑ 𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1  is the K-period portfolio return; SENT is the investor sentiment 
index; EP refers to the market-level earnings-to-price ratio; RF is the risk-free rate 
measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed deposits; INFL refers to the 
monthly inflation rate; MKT is the excess return on market portfolio; SMB refers to the 
average return on small stock portfolios over the average returns on large stock portfolios; 
and HML refers to the average return on high book-to-market stock portfolios over the 
average returns on high book-to-market stock portfolios. I expect β to be significantly 
negative as it represents the sensitivity of subsequent returns to investor sentiment. I apply 
the same approach as in Equation (3) to cope with the biases in the test statistics. To test 
the main hypothesis, I form equal-weighted portfolios on local and nonlocal firms. To 
distinguish the effect of geographic distance from that of financial centers, I form equal-
weighted portfolios on local and nonlocal firms after excluding firms located in Beijing, 
Shanghai or Shenzhen.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the number of firms in each portfolio using different geographic 
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cutting boundaries with or without firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, 
respectively. I carry out the regression model estimation for the portfolios sorted by 
geographic distance. Table 5 reports the SENT coefficient estimation results on local and 
nonlocal firms, with the local portfolio consisting of firms headquartered within a radius 
of 250 miles, 100 miles or 100 kilometers 16  from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, 
whereas the nonlocal portfolio consists of firms that are headquartered outside these 
boundaries. D1 consists of the firms located within a radius of 100 kilometers from 
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, whereas D3 consists of firms located outside a radius of 
1,000 kilometers from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. For the sake of brevity, I do not 
report the coefficients for EP, RF, INFL, MKT, SMB and HML because they are not the 
primary focus of my study.17 Consistent with the previous results of the price reversal 
shown in Panel B of Table 2 and the results reported by Firth et al. (2015) on corporate 
transparency, the bias-adjusted coefficient estimates of SENT over the three horizons are 
all negative and significant over 12- and 15-month horizon. Most importantly, in line with 
the behavioral bias hypothesis, local firms are more affected by investor sentiment than 
nonlocal firms (the distance effect). The differences between the SENT coefficients in 
local and nonlocal firms are statistically significant across all three horizons for all of the 
aforementioned geographic cutting boundaries. The results are also significant in 
economic terms. For instance, an increase of one standard deviation in the sentiment index 
results in an additional decline of 150 basis points in the stock prices of local firms over 
                                                             
16 I also test the difference between local and nonlocal firms in terms of sentiment effect using 150miles, 200miles as 
local and nonlocal firms cutting boundary, the results are similar.  
17 The detailed regression results are available from the author upon request. 
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nonlocal firms in the subsequent 12 month-period using the geographic cutting boundary 
of 250 miles.  
 
Table 6 summarizes the SENT coefficient estimation results for local and nonlocal firms 
after excluding firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Firstly, although the bias-
adjusted coefficients on SENT are still negative and significant for all firms over 12 and 
15 months, the differences between the SENT coefficients in local and nonlocal firms are 
marginally significant when using 250 miles and 100 miles as the geographic cutting 
boundary. The difference in sentiment coefficients between local and nonlocal firms is 
almost zero and insignificant when using 100 kilometers as cutting boundary, but the 
number of nonlocal companies are over ten times more than local companies. Secondly, 
the magnitude of the differences also declines. For example, local firms bear an additional 
decrease of 100 basis points18 in their market value compared with nonlocal firms for a 
one standard deviation increase in market optimism for the 12-month horizon when using 
100 miles as local and nonlocal cutting boundary. In addition, the differences in the SENT 
coefficients between the D1 and D3 portfolios are marginally significant for the above 
three horizons, and the magnitude of the difference in sentiment effect between D1 and 
D3 portfolio also decreased. For instance, D1 firms bear additional 130 basis points 
decrease of their market value than D3 firms in the following 12 months for one standard 
deviation increase in market sentiment without firms headquartered in Beijing, Shanghai 
or Shenzhen, as compared to a decrease of 290 basis points when including firms in 
                                                             
18 The additional decrease is 170 basis points when including firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, see 
Panel B of Table 4. 
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Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen.  
 
I interpret these results as indicating that financial centers play an important but not 
indispensable role in the relation between geographic distance and the investor sentiment 
effect. Specifically, a financial center offers facilities and intermediaries that facilitate 
social interactions in the financial market and therefore increase the level of familiarity 
with local firms. However, investors’ behavioral bias may not be confined within the 
financial center but may spill out to nearby areas. As a result, the distance effect remains 
after excluding firms located within financial centers.  
 
3.3.3. Chinese High Speed Railway reform as an exogenous shock 
 
Next, I use the Chinese HSR reform as an exogenous shock to investigate whether the 
construction of transport infrastructure affects the impact of geographic distance on the 
sentiment-driven stock price relationship. HSR construction is intended to connect 
provincial capitals and other major cities by faster means of transportation, and the 
decision on the placement of HSR lines is built on a comprehensive consideration of the 
economic development, population and resource distribution, national security, 
environmental concerns and social stability of each region (Mid-to-Long Railway Plan, 
2008), which have no direct relation with the investor sentiment effect. Therefore, the 
HSR reform serves as a reasonable exogenous shock in this setting. Moreover, the 
upgrading of transportation reduces both the time and transportation cost of inter-city 
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travel. As a result, it may facilitate social interactions between market participants and 
thus increase the degree of familiarity. If this were the case, I would expect the distance 
effect to decrease or even disappear for firms with headquarters in cities connected to 
HSR lines, whereas it should still exist for firms unconnected to HSR lines.  
 
First, I examine the difference in the sentiment effect on nonlocal firms unconnected to 
and connected to HSR lines, respectively, before and after the launch of HSR services, 
respectively. I pay special attention to whether nonlocal firms are connected to HSR lines 
because the magnitude of the decrease in time and transportation costs is lower for local 
firms. In order to mitigate the confounding effect of aviation, I restrict nonlocal firms 
located within 1500 kilometer-radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and do the same 
analysis as before. Second, I investigate whether the distance effect exists if I divide firms 
into local and nonlocal groups based on travel times by railway, airline and toll road from 
the headquarters of a firm to a financial center. 
 
Specifically, I separate 2,058 firms into local and nonlocal portfolios using 250 miles as 
the geographic cutting boundary. This procedure yields 1,205 local firms and 853 
nonlocal firms. Considering that local firms are within the 250-mile radius of either 
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and the lowest speed of HSR lines is 250 km/h, the HSR 
reform has much less impact on shortening the travel time for local firms than for nonlocal 
firms, I then focus on the effect of HSR connection for nonlocal firms. Specifically, I 
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choose 200719 as the event year because China’s HSR service opened on April 18, 2007. 
I hand collect the data for the specific year in which a prefecture-level city opened its 
HSR service from the China Railway Press and match it with the headquarters of nonlocal 
firms. This procedure yields 215 nonlocal firms connected to the HSR in 2007 and 230 
nonlocal firms that remain unconnected in 2007 and afterwards. Following Chang and 
Wong (2009), I match firms that experienced the HSR shock in 2007 with firms that did 
not. I first match each shocked firm with a firm in the same industry that stayed 
unconnected to the HSR in 2007 and afterwards. If multiple firms satisfy this criteria, 
then I include the firm closest in size to that of the shocked firm in year -1. I find 205 
unconnected firms that are matched with shocked firms on the basis of industry and firm 
size.  
 
Applying the same approach taken for Equation (4), I sort the portfolios on local and 
nonlocal firms, respectively. While the group of local firms remains unchanged, nonlocal 
firms are divided into two groups according to the foregoing procedure. Specifically, I 
compute the difference in equal-weighted portfolio returns between local and nonlocal 
firms unconnected to HSR lines (control group) and between local and nonlocal firms 
that experienced HSR reform (treatment group), respectively. Then, I investigate the 
difference in the relation between distance and the investor sentiment effect on the 
treatment and control groups both before and after 2007. In addition, I restrict nonlocal 
                                                             
19 I also try to use different years as the event year. However, there are only 31 nonlocal firms and 50 nonlocal firms 
that began connected to HSR in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The results are less meaningful due to small sample 
size.  
 45 
 
firms located within 1500 kilometer-radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and do the 
same analysis on treatment and control group, respectively to mitigate the confounding 
effect of aviation.  
 
Moreover, I divide firms into local and nonlocal groups according to the travel times from 
a firm’s headquarters to a financial center. The measurement of travel times is based on 
a comprehensive consideration of railway, airline and toll road. Firstly, for firms located 
within 300 kilometer-radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, I assume that market 
participants can reach financial centers by toll road within 4 hours20 since the average 
speed of the National Trunk Highway System is 100 km/h (Li and Shum, 2001) and 
considering that there may exist some curves on toll road because the construction of toll 
road is based on the consideration of regional development21; Secondly, I hand collect the 
shortest travel time from the headquarter of a firm to Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen via 
railway (including HSR) from Chinese Railway Press from 2006 to 2013. I add one hour 
to all the travel time by train for market participants to travel to railway station and come 
to their destination. Finally, for firms located outside 1500 kilometer-radius22 of Beijing, 
Shanghai or Shenzhen, I hand collect the travel time from a firm to the nearest financial 
center by plane from Ctrip. I also add 3 hours for all the travel time by plane since 
passengers are supposed to arrive in airport 2 hours before the airplane take off and I 
leave 1 hour for them to come to airport and get to their destination. Firms located in the 
                                                             
20 A one-day round business trip. 
21 I leave 100 kilometers for the curve. 
22 The competitive radius of HSR is within 1500 kilometer-radius. 
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cities within 12 hours to Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen are grouped as local firms 
whereas firms headquartered in the cities exceed 12 hours to Beijing, Shanghai or 
Shenzhen are classified as nonlocal firms. In order to better test the role of travel time in 
sentiment-driven stock price relationship, I further group firms located in the cities within 
4 hours to Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen as local firms whereas firms headquartered in 
the cities exceed 12 hours to Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen are classified as nonlocal 
firms. I then examine whether the distance effect exists for local and nonlocal firms based 
on travel time following the same approach as for Equation (4).  
 
Table 7 reports the SENT coefficient estimation results for the treatment group. Panel A 
shows that the distance effect exists before the HSR reform. Specifically, local firms are 
more affected by investor sentiment than nonlocal firms from 2003 to 2006 across three 
time horizons. For instance, an increase of one standard deviation in the sentiment index 
results in a decline of an additional 390 basis points in the stock prices of local over 
nonlocal firms in the subsequent 12-monthperiod. However, the distance effect 
disappears after the HSR reform in 2007. Panel B of Table 7 shows that the differences 
in the SENT coefficient estimation between local and nonlocal firms becomes 
insignificant, although the biased-adjusted SENT coefficients are universally and 
significantly negative for the three horizons. Moreover, the distance effect for the 
treatment group also disappears for the whole sample period from 2003 to 2015, as 
reported in Panel C of Table 7.  
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In contrast, in the control group, local firms are more affected by investor sentiment than 
nonlocal firms across the three sample periods, namely, 2003 to 2006, 2007 to 2015 and 
2003 to 2015, as reported in Table 8, Panels A to C. For example, local firms bear a 
decrease of an extra 290 basis points in their market prices compared with nonlocal firms 
for each one standard deviation increase in investor optimism for the 12-month horizon 
before the HSR reform in 2007, and this distance effect is also significant from 2007 to 
2015. Local firms bear an additional 320-point decline in their market value over nonlocal 
firms in the subsequent 15 months for each one standard deviation increase in the 
sentiment index over the whole sample period from 2003 to 2015. Obviously, the distance 
effect holds for the control group when nonlocal firms remain unconnected to the HSR.  
 
Furthermore, Figure 2 presents the trends of the differences in the SENT coefficients over 
a 24-month period on the time-series regressions of Equation (4) before and after the HSR 
reform for the treatment group and control group, respectively. Panel A shows that the 
trends for the two groups are quite similar. Both of the lines are negative over the 24-
month period, suggesting that local firms are more affected by the general market 
sentiment than nonlocal firms in both the treatment and control groups before the HSR 
reform. However, after the reform, the gap between the SENT coefficients of the two 
groups becomes larger. Specifically, the differences in the SENT coefficients for the 
treatment group are generally positive, indicating that nonlocal firms are more affected 
by investor sentiment, although this relation is insignificant. In contrast, the differences 
in the SENT coefficients for the control group are generally negative, suggesting that the 
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distance effect still exists after the HSR reform for control group.  
 
Table 9 and Table 10 conduct the same analysis as in Table7 and Table 8 but restrict the 
firms headquartered within 1500 kilometer-radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. The 
results are robust in the competitive radii of HSR.   
 
The above results provide support for the notion that the construction of transportation 
infrastructure may alter the effect of geographic distance on the sentiment-driven stock 
price relationship. To put it another way, I verify the importance of geographic distance 
in explaining the sensitivity of stock prices to market sentiment using the HSR reform as 
an exogenous shock to test the changes in the distance effect on the treatment and control 
groups.  
 
Table 11 reports the results for the relation between travel time and sentiment effect. 
Firms with shorter travel times to a financial center are more affected by investor 
sentiment than their counterparts. Panel A shows that firms within a 12-hour travel 
distance of a financial center are more affected by investor sentiment than firms with a 
travel distance of more than 12 hours to either Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Panel B 
summarizes that firms within a 4-hour travel time of a financial center are more affected 
by investor sentiment than firms with a travel time of more than 12 hours to either Beijing, 
Shanghai or Shenzhen. For both Panel A and Panel B, the SENT coefficients become 
more negative as the travel time from a firm’s headquarters to the nearest financial center 
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decreases. For instance, the SENT coefficients for firms within a 4-hour travel time are 
considerably lower than those of their control counterparts and their differences are all 
statistically significant at the 5% level across the three horizons. These results provide 
important evidence that travel time is a channel to stimulate social interactions across 
cities and firms located in cities near financial center bear higher degree of familiarity 
than other firms.  
 
3.3.4. Additional analyses 
 
3.3.4.1. Stock market participation and investor sentiment effect 
 
To offer more evidence for the behavioral bias hypothesis, I examine the relation between 
the stock market participation rate and investor sentiment effect. Brown et al. (2008) 
establish a casual relation between an individual’s decision to own a stock and the average 
stock market participation rate of the individual’s community. They further argue that 
word-of-mouth communication drives this causal effect. This study supports the notion 
that social interactions affect the regional stock market participation rate. The mechanism 
by which the market participation rate influences the sentiment-driven stock price relation 
is as follows. Provinces with a high stock market participation rate are likely to have more 
investors talking about their investments, which could increase the degree of familiarity. 
For instance, investors may envy others’ success in the stock market and follow their 
neighbors or acquaintances in buying certain stocks when they have little information 
 50 
 
about the fundamentals of these stocks. Therefore, firms headquartered in provinces with 
a high market participation rate are affected more by investor sentiment than firms 
headquartered in low market participation regions. I conduct the following test to support 
my argument.  
 
I divide firms into portfolios based on the stock market participation rate of the province 
where a firm’s headquarters is located from 2003 to 2014.23  Specifically, the stock 
market participation rate is defined as the provincial-level total stock accounts divided by 
the year-end population in that province. Firms located in the top three24 stock market 
participation provinces are identified as high stock market participation firms and the rest 
as low stock market participation firms each year. I apply the same approach taken for 
Equation (4) to compare the difference in the investor sentiment effect for High firms and 
Low firms.  
 
Panel A of Table 12 lists the top three provinces in terms of the stock market participation 
rate from 2003 to 2014. The table shows that Shanghai always ranks first, ranging from 
43.79% in 2005 to 80.90% in 2009, followed by Beijing, Guangdong and Tianjin. In 
addition, the participation rate in these provinces increases across years, suggesting the 
development of the financial market in China. Panel B of Table 12 reports the regression 
results for the relation between the investor sentiment effect and the stock market 
                                                             
23 Before April 2015, a person could only open only one stock trading account in China. In most cases, investor’s 
account address and living address are same. 
24 I consider the top three provinces because the stock market participation rate in other provinces is quite low, 
around 10% or lower from 2003 to 2014.  
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participation rate. Across three horizons, I consistently find that the SENT coefficients 
on high stock market participation firms are more negative than those on their 
counterparts. The High-minus-Low portfolio comparison suggests that the differences in 
the SENT coefficients are highly significant. This result supports the behavioral bias 
hypothesis by offering evidence that firms located in the provinces with high market 
participation are more affected by investor sentiment than firms located in other provinces. 
 
3.3.4.2. Number of analyst recommendations and the investor sentiment effect 
 
In addition, I seek additional evidence to explain why firms that are headquartered 
proximate to a financial center are more affected by market sentiment than firms that are 
farther away. I pay special attention to sell-side analysts because they are in charge of 
offering investment advice to their clients and generating more trades for brokerage firms, 
and because their workplaces are predominantly located in or near financial centers. Thus, 
analysts may conveniently choose to cover more local than nonlocal firms given the time 
and transportation costs. Moreover, previous studies document that sell-side analysts 
reveal an overoptimistic bias in their earnings forecasts or stock recommendations and 
attribute it to their strategic behavior or cognitive bias (e.g., Brown, 1997; Lin and 
McNichols, 1998; Qian, 2009; Firth et al., 2013). Most importantly, investor sentiment 
can affect analysts. Bagnoli et al. (2009) suggest that analysts who know that investor 
sentiment has an impact on stock prices pay attention to market sentiment when issuing 
stock recommendations. If this is the case, analysts’ behavioral bias may fuel the degree 
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of familiarity and thereby intensify the sentiment effect near financial centers.  
 
Following Hribar and McInnis (2012), I calculate the analysts’ forecast errors on local 
and nonlocal portfolios, respectively, and compare the difference in analysts’ optimistic 
bias between local and nonlocal firms. However, the difference is not statistically 
significant.25A plausible explanation is that analysts know that unsophisticated individual 
investors pay more attention to the frequency of recommendations rather than the 
earnings forecasts and use investors’ psychological bias to fuel the investor sentiment 
effect on local firms.  
 
I then examine the impact of the number of analyst recommendations on the sentiment-
driven stock price relationship. Following Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), I 
investigate the association between sentiment and number of analyst recommendations 
on local and nonlocal firms using the following regression model: 
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                (5) 
 
The dependent variable 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the quarterly stock recommendation frequency issued 
for firm 𝑖 in quarter t. I compute the quarterly recommendation frequency based on three 
types, namely, “Strong buy”, “Buy” and “Hold or worse,” and run the preceding 
regression for each of these three types. 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1  is the average monthly investor 
                                                             
25 The result is available upon request. 
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sentiment index in quarter t-1 and Local is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
local and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑡−1 represents a vector of quarterly control variables including 
the seasonally adjusted percentage change in GDP in quarter t-1 (GDPCHG), gross 
returns on the value-weighted market index over the 12 months before the beginning of 
quarter t (PASTMARKET), and the volatility of gross market returns during the 12 
months before the beginning of quarter t (MARKETVOL). 𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 stands for a vector of 
firm-quarter control variables that contains the natural logarithm of a firm’s asset value 
Size, book-to-market ratio (BTM) and gross market returns over the past 12 months 
(RET), and the standard deviation of each firm’s monthly returns over the past 12 months 
(RETVOL). I also include lagged capital expenditure as a percentage of total assets 
(CAPEX) and lagged return on assets (ROA) as control variables. All of the firm-level 
control variables are winsorized at the 1% level to reduce the effect of outliers. I include 
the binary indicator variables for firms that report a loss in any of the previous four 
quarters (LOSS) and for firm quarters containing equity issues (ISSUE). I further include 
the institutional ownership (IOHLD) of each firm to control for the institutional attention. 
Finally, I include firm and year fixed effects because the number of analyst 
recommendations increases during my sample period, as shown in Panel B of Table 13. 
All of the analyst recommendation and stock price data are taken from CSMAR and the 
GDP data are from the Statistical Bureau of the PRC from 2003 to 2015.  
 
Panel A of Table 13 reports the univariate test results for quarterly analyst coverage on 
local and nonlocal firms from 2003 to 2015. Analyst coverage equals 0 if no analyst is 
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following a firm in a certain quarter. Analyst coverage for local firms is then computed 
as the number of analysts who issued stock recommendations for firms located within a 
250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, and that for nonlocal firms as the 
number of analysts who issued stock recommendations for firms headquartered outside 
this radius. The univariate analysis shows that more analysts follow local than nonlocal 
firms, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Although the 
magnitude is small, I attribute it to many of the 2,058 firms in my sample period receiving 
no analyst attention. 
 
Table 14 summarizes the regression results for the relation between the number of stock 
recommendations and investor sentiment for local and nonlocal firms. The summary 
statistics of the variables in the regression are presented in Panel A of Table 14. The mean 
quarterly frequency of “Strong buy” recommendations in the sample is 3.16, and the 
average quarterly frequencies of “Buy” recommendations and “Hold or worse” 
recommendations are 4.45 and 0.89, respectively. The average number of stock 
recommendations in each quarter is 8.5. While the average firm is followed by two 
analysts each quarter, the mean institutional ownership of the firms in the sample is 2.28%. 
On average, 57% of firms are classified in the local group in my sample. Panel B of Table 
14 reports the initial results for the relationship between stock recommendations and 
investor sentiment in terms of local and nonlocal firms. On average, local firms have 41 
more “Strong buy” recommendations than nonlocal firms in each quarter. This number is 
significant in economic terms because the mean number of “Strong buy” 
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recommendations in the sample is 3.16. The local firms also have 27 more “Buy” 
recommendations than nonlocal firms on average. Moreover, the significantly positive 
interaction of Local and SENT for “Strong buy” recommendations indicates that such 
recommendations are more likely for local firms when investor sentiment is high.  
 
However, analysts self-select whether to follow a firm. Rather than local firms’ 
geographic location, these results could be driven solely by local firms being followed by 
more overoptimistic analysts, making the firms subject to more overoptimistic 
recommendations. To address this problem, I use Heckman’s two-stage method to 
address the concern of a self-selection bias. First, I use the following probit regression to 
estimate the probability of a firm receiving a stock recommendation: 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 +
 𝛾𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                (6) 
 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm 𝑖  has analyst 
recommendations in quarter t, and 0 otherwise. 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the number of firms in the 
same industry as firm 𝑖 in quarter t. 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 is associated with the probability of issuing 
stock recommendations because the information gathering cost reduces as the number of 
firms in a certain industry increases, but it has no obvious relation to whether a firm 
receives a certain type of stock recommendation. This variable is used for identification 
purposes. The definitions of the other control variables are the same as those given for 
Equation (5). In the second stage, I use the following regression to re-estimate the relation 
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between stock recommendations and investor sentiment on local and nonlocal firms after 
controlling for macro- and firm-level variables by including the inverse Mills ratio 
obtained from the first-stage regression: 
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝛾𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽4𝐿𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                     (7) 
 
where 𝐿𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎 is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-stage regression. Panel 
C of Table 14 reports the result for Equation (6). The coefficient on 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡  is 
significantly positive, suggesting that a firm is more likely to receive analyst coverage 
when there are more firms operating in the same industry. In addition, a firm is more 
likely to be covered by analysts when market sentiment, book-to-market ratio, return on 
assets, capital expenditure percentage, institutional ownership, past returns and past 
market volatility are high, and if the firm is large or located close to a financial center, 
while past return volatility, gross returns on market index and seasonally adjusted GDP 
are low or suffered a loss in the last quarter.  
 
Panel D of Table 14 reports the regression results for Equation (7). Compared with the 
baseline model in Panel C of Table 14, where I did not correct for the self-selection bias, 
the main results still hold. Specifically, the coefficients of SENT for “Strong buy” and 
“Buy” recommendations are significantly positive, suggesting that analysts issue more 
positive stock recommendations when investor sentiment is high. Similar to the results 
for the baseline regression, local firms obtain more “Strong buy” recommendations and 
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“Buy” recommendations. When investor sentiment is high, local firms get more “Strong 
buy” recommendations.  
 
In sum, these results suggest that local firms receive more favorable recommendations 
than nonlocal firms. When investor sentiment is high (low), local firms have more (fewer) 
“Strong buy” recommendations than nonlocal firms. The results from the Heckman two-
stage model suggest that the overall results are unlikely to be driven by a self-selection 
bias. 
 
Furthermore, I investigate the implications of stock recommendations on the value of 
local and nonlocal firms. Following Firth et al. (2013), I examine the stock market’s 
reaction to analyst recommendations upon report issuance. Specifically, I focus on the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) centered on the recommendation date over the 
three-day event window from one day before until one day after. I use the market-adjusted 
abnormal returns, defined as the stock’s return over the value-weighted market returns 
for firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. I then cumulate the daily 
abnormal returns over the three-day event window to get the three-day CARs (CAR(-
1,+1)). Panel E of Table 14 shows that positive recommendations, including “Strong buy” 
and “Buy” recommendations, generate significantly positive three-day CARs for both 
local and nonlocal firms, whereas negative “Hold or worse” recommendations produce 
significantly negative three-day CARs for both local and nonlocal firms, suggesting that 
favorable recommendations have a positive effect on short-term stock prices while 
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unfavorable ones have a negative effect on short-term prices. In addition, the abnormal 
returns for the three types of recommendations on local firms are all significantly greater 
than those for nonlocal firms, suggesting that market reactions to the stock 
recommendations for local firms are more optimistic than those for nonlocal firms, which 
is consistent with the conjecture that the familiarity bias is initiated near financial centers 
and financial analysts fuel investors’ behavioral bias. 
 
3.3.4.3 Institutional ownership and investor sentiment 
 
Previous literatures document that local institutional investors can utilize informational 
advantages and realize abnormal returns in their local investments (e.g.: Coval and 
Moskowitz, 2001; Baik et al., 2010). As institutional investors are mainly located near 
financial centers, some may argue that local firms may have higher institutional 
ownership than nonlocal firms and institutional investor may play a role in the relation 
between distance and sentiment-driven stock price relationship.  
 
I do a two-way and a four-way analysis to address this concern. Table 15 reports a 
comparison of institutional holdings between local and nonlocal firms in high- and low-
sentiment period. Specifically, Panel A of Table 15 shows that there is no significantly 
differences between local and nonlocal firms in terms of institutional ownership. In Panel 
B, when investor sentiment is high, institutional investors buy more stocks indiscriminate 
of local and nonlocal firms than low-sentiment period. For example, institutional 
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ownership of high-sentiment period is 0.75%26 more than that of low-sentiment period 
for nonlocal firms. However, the difference of institutional holding between local and 
nonlocal firms within each sentimental group is not statistically significant. These results 
help to relief the concern that the geographic component in the sentiment-driven stock 
price relationship is driven by institutional investors and supports the notion that it is the 
retail investors who are relatively inexperienced and more prone to market sentiment may 
drive our main result. 
 
3.3.4.4. GDP and the investor sentiment effect 
 
Some may argue that the distance effect could be caused by different levels of economic 
development rather than cognitive bias as I propose, as regions located near to financial 
centers also tend to be more developed economically. For example, investors who reside 
in more economically developed regions tend to be richer and may be more willing to 
take risks or even to gamble when investing in the stock market. If this is the case, one 
may expect firms headquartered in more developed areas to be more affected by investor 
sentiment than other firms.  
 
To address this concern, I investigate the relation between GDP and the investor 
sentiment effect. I divide firms into portfolios based on the nominal GDP of the province 
where a firm’s headquarters is located from 2003 to 2015. Firms located in the top 10 
                                                             
26 This magnitude is significant since the mean of institutional holding is 2.28%. 
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GDP provinces are identified as High GDP firms and those in other provinces as Low 
GDP firms in each year. I apply the same approach as for Equation (4) to compare the 
difference in the investor sentiment effect on High and Low portfolios.  
 
Panel A of Table 16 presents the regression results for the relation between GDP and the 
investor sentiment effect. I find the consistent result that the SENT coefficients on high 
GDP firms are no more negative than those on low GDP firms across three horizons. The 
High-minus-Low portfolio comparison suggests that the differences in SENT coefficients 
are not significant. Panel B of Table 16 conducts the regression analysis on GDP and the 
sentiment effect after excluding firms located in either Beijing, Shanghai or Guangdong 
(where Shenzhen is located) and the results are similar across three horizons. These 
results support the notion that my main result on the distance effect is not driven by 
different levels of economic development.  
 
Chapter 4. Conclusions 
 
This study examines the role of geographic distance in the sentiment-driven stock price 
relationship in the context of China’s stock market. I provide comprehensive evidence 
that firms with greater proximity to financial centers are more affected by the general 
market sentiment than firms far away from financial centers. In addition, using the 
Chinese HSR reform as an exogenous shock, I find that the relation between distance and 
the investor sentiment effect disappears for firms that become connected to HSR lines but 
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holds for firms that stay unconnected, suggesting that upgrading the transport 
infrastructure facilitates social interactions and mitigates the importance of geographic 
distance in the sentiment-driven stock price relation. Moreover, I find that firms within a 
4-hour travel distance to a financial center are more affected by sentiment than those that 
are more than 12 hours away. The result confirms that travel time is an important 
determinant of the investor sentiment effect. Finally, I offer additional evidence for the 
relation between geographic distance and the sensitivity of stock price to investor 
sentiment. First, firms located in provinces with higher stock market participation rates 
are more affected by investor sentiment than firms headquartered in other provinces. 
Second, analysts increase the frequency of favorable recommendations for firms that are 
located closer to financial centers when investor sentiment is high and the stock market 
reactions to analyst recommendations are in line with my findings. Finally, I provide 
evidence that the distance effect is not driven by institutional investors or regional 
economic development. Overall, my study highlights the importance of geographic 
distance in explaining investor sentiment effects.  
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Table 1:  Summary statistics of investor sentiment data and control variables 
 
This table reports the summary statistics for the sentiment component from 2003 to 2015. 
CEFD is the value-weighted average discount rate of closed-end mutual funds. TURN is 
the natural log of monthly market trading volume divided by the average market value, 
detrended by the 5-month moving average. NIPO is the monthly number of initial public 
offerings. RIPO is the average market-adjusted first-day returns of initial public offerings. 
Eshare is the ratio of equity issues to total equity issues and bank borrowing. DSG is the 
growth rate of savings deposits controlling for the growth of money supply (M0). NACT 
is the natural log of new investment accounts (in thousands). SENT is the first principal 
component of the seven sentiment proxies.  
 
Panel A reports the summary statistics for the raw sentiment component. In Panel B, I 
regress each of the seven proxies on the growth in industrial production and consumption 
growth rate. The orthogonalized proxies, prefixed with “residual,” are the residuals from 
these regressions. SENT_1 is the first principal component of the seven orthogonalized 
proxies. In Panel C, EP is the market-level earnings-to-price ratio. RF is the risk-free rate, 
measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed deposits. INFL is the monthly 
rate of inflation. MKT is the excess return on the market portfolio of stocks. SMB (HML) 
is the difference each month between average returns on the small-stock portfolio (the 
high BM portfolio) and average returns on the large-stock portfolio (the low BM 
portfolio). *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level and * at the 0.1 
level. 
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Panel A: Raw data 
 
Variable Mean SD P25 Median P75 
CEFD_t（%） 17.85  12.28  6.74  16.43  26.03  
TURN_t-1 6.10  0.48  5.75  6.03  6.42  
NIPO_t 7.64  7.25  0.00  6.00  13.00  
RIPO_t-1(%) 0.77  0.77  0.36  0.58  0.92  
Eshare_t(%) 1.34  1.45  0.42  0.94  1.78  
DSG_t-1(%) 0.05  0.88  -0.39  0.06  0.46  
NACT_t-1 6.22  1.27  5.11  6.26  7.04  
 
 
Correlation CEFD TURN NIPO RIPO Eshare DSG NACT SENT SENT_1 
CEFD_t（%） 1         
TURN_t-1 -0.0627 1        
NIPO_t -0.2629*** 0.2460*** 1       
RIPO_t-1(%) 0.2417*** 0.2124** -0.1740* 1      
Eshare_t(%) 0.0331 0.4302*** 0.4492*** 0.4015*** 1     
DSG_t-1(%) 0.0964 -0.1680** -0.1740** -0.1173 
-
0.2740*** 
1    
NACT_t-1 -0.4975*** 0.7467*** 0.4434*** 0.1518 0.4052*** -0.2030** 1   
SENT -0.1952** 0.8600*** 0.5834*** 0.3065*** 0.6822*** 
-
0.4601*** 
0.8527*** 1  
SENT_1 -0.1018 0.7683*** 0.4944*** 0.3235*** 0.6872*** 
-
0.5378*** 
0.6997*** 0.9102*** 1 
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Panel B: Controlling for macroeconomic conditions 
 
Variable Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
residual_CEFD_t
（%） 
0.00  10.09  -6.27  -3.73  6.94  
residual_TURN_t-1 0.00  0.45  -0.30  -0.09  0.32  
residual_NIPO_t 0.00  7.00  -6.10  -1.08  4.25  
residual_RIPO_t-1(%) 0.00  0.74  -0.38  -0.09  0.11  
residual_Eshare_t(%) 0.00  1.39  -0.78  -0.34  0.47  
residual_DSG_t-1(%) 0.00  0.88  -0.43  0.03  0.40  
residual_NACT_t-1 0.00  1.07  -0.63  -0.12  0.55  
 
Correlation R_CEFD R_TURN R_NIPO R_RIPO R_Eshare R_DSG R_NACT SENT SENT_1 
R_CEFD_t（%） 1         
R_TURN_t-1 0.0793 1        
R_NIPO_t -0.3861*** 0.2155*** 1       
R_RIPO_t-1(%) 0.1616* 0.2111** -0.2095** 1      
R_Eshare_t(%) -0.0739 0.4455*** 0.4073*** 0.3549*** 1     
R_DSG_t-1(%) 0.1002 -0.1877** -0.1956** -0.1397 -0.3036*** 1    
R_NACT_t-1 -0.4462*** 0.7005*** 0.4356*** 0.1834* 0.4389*** -0.2591*** 1   
SENT -0.1291 0.7809*** 0.4846*** 0.2857*** 0.6334*** -0.4787*** 0.7538*** 1  
SENT_1 -0.1128 0.8313*** 0.5035*** 0.3398*** 0.7201*** -0.5386*** 0.8365*** 0.9102*** 1 
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Panel C: SENT and control variables 
 
Variable Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
SENT 0.000  1.000  -0.677  -0.073  0.592  
EP（%） 0.089  0.031  0.062  0.083  0.106  
RF（%） 0.224  0.054  0.188  0.210  0.250  
INFL
（%） 
2.761  2.112  1.400  2.400  4.000  
MKT 0.009  0.089  -0.051  0.015  0.055  
SMB 0.009  0.047  -0.015  0.011  0.036  
HML 0.001  0.033  -0.017  0.000  0.019  
 
Correlation SENT EP RF INFL MKT SMB HML 
SENT 1       
EP（%） -0.1224 1      
RF（%） -0.0239 
-
0.2915*** 
1     
INFL
（%） 
-0.0645 -0.371*** 0.6688*** 1    
MKT 0.1929** 0.2192*** -0.1881** -0.2712*** 1   
SMB 0.1211 -0.1646** 0.0091 -0.0126 0.1715** 1  
HML -0.0694 0.0976 0.0333 0.0304 0.0903 -0.4872*** 1 
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Table 2: Validation of the sentiment index and its relation with future stock 
returns 
 
This table reports the results from the time-series regression of excess market returns 
on investor sentiment over a 24-month period in Equation (3). Panel A presents the 
coefficients from the time-series regressions; the simulated p-values reported in 
parentheses are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope coefficient does not 
equal 0. Panel B shows the graph of the SENT coefficient β over time. 
 
Panel A: Time-series regressions of excess market returns on investor sentiment (SENT) 
  
K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
β*100 0.95  0.84  0.33  -0.01  -0.20  -0.23  -0.43  -0.64  
p-value (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.82) (0.95) (0.72) (0.56) (0.33) 
K 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
β*100 -0.84  -0.99  -1.09  -1.12  -1.09  -1.12  -1.10  -1.05  
p-value (0.20) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
K 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
β*100 -0.99  -0.96  -1.01  -1.00  -0.98  -0.98  -0.97  -0.96  
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
 
Panel B: Graph of the SENT coefficient β over time 
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Figure 1: Comparison of sentiment indices 
 
This graph compares the investor sentiment indices. sentiment1 (dotted line) is the sentiment index constructed by Firth et al. (2015), 
whereas sentiment2 (solid line) represents the sentiment index formulated in this study.  
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Table 3: Sample selection 
 
This table presents the sample selection procedure for firms listed on China’s A-share 
market.  
 
  
No. 
Observations 
1. All firms listed on the A-share market before the end of 2013 2,549 
2. Dropping firms listed on the Growth Enterprise Market 2,194 
3. Dropping financial firms 2,148 
4. Dropping delisted firms 2,058 
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Table 4: Number of firms in each geographic portfolio 
 
This table summarizes the number of firms sorted in each portfolio using different 
geographic cutting boundaries. Panel A (Panel B) reports the number of firms in local 
and nonlocal portfolios including (excluding) firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or 
Shenzhen when applying 100kilometers, 100 miles and 250 miles as local and nonlocal 
cutting boundary; Panel C (Panel D) report the number of firms in D1, D2 and D3 
portfolio including (excluding) firms headquartered in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, 
where D1 represents the number of firms located within a 100-kilometer radius of 
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, while D3 shows the number of firms headquartered 
outside a 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and D2 stands for 
firms located between 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and 
1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. 
 
Panel A: The number of firms on local and nonlocal portfolio including firms located in Beijing, 
Shanghai or Shenzhen 
 
Cutting Boundary Local firms Nonlocal firms  Total 
100kilometers 610 1448 2058 
100miles 831 1227 2058 
250miles 1205 853 2058 
 
Panel B: The number of firms on local and nonlocal portfolio excluding firms located in Beijing, 
Shanghai or Shenzhen 
 
Cutting Boundary Local firms Nonlocal firms Total 
100kilometers 108 1448 1556 
100miles 329 1227 1556 
250miles 703 853 1556 
 
 
Panel C: The number of firms on D1, D2 and D3 portfolio including firms located in Beijing, 
Shanghai or Shenzhen 
 
D1 D2 D3 Total 
610 1213 235 2058 
 
Panel D: The number of firms on D1, D2 and D3 portfolio excluding firms located in Beijing, 
Shanghai or Shenzhen 
 
D1 D2 D3 Total 
108 1213 235 1556 
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Table 5: Geographic distance and the investor sentiment effect 
 
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment 
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the 
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which 
are defined as for Equation 4. I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted 
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on 
local firms and Nonlocal represents those on nonlocal firms. Local–Nonlocal represents 
the difference in the average stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A 
uses 250 miles as the cutting boundary for local and nonlocal firms, Panel B uses 100 
miles and Panel C uses 100 kilometers. D1 represents the average returns of firms 
located within a 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, while D3 
shows the average returns of firms headquartered outside a 1,000-kilometer radius of 
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and D2 stands for the average returns of firms located 
between 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and 1,000-kilometer 
radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Simulated p-values are reported in 
parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β 
does not equal 0.  
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 250 miles as the 
local–nonlocal boundary 
 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.065  -0.053  -0.012  
 (0.18) (0.32) (0.01) 
12 months -0.104  -0.090  -0.015  
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) 
15 months -0.116  -0.099  -0.017  
  (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) 
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 miles as the 
local–nonlocal boundary 
 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.069 -0.055 -0.014 
 (0.15) (0.30) (0.00) 
12 months -0.109 -0.091 -0.017 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.01) 
15 months -0.120 -0.101 -0.019 
 (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) 
Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 kilometers as 
the local–nonlocal boundary 
 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.071  -0.055  -0.015  
 (0.14) (0.28) (0.00) 
12 months -0.110  -0.093  -0.017  
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) 
15 months -0.122  -0.101  -0.019  
  (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) 
Panel D: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 kilometers and 
1,000 kilometers as the boundary dividing D1, D2 and D3 
Horizon D1 D2 D3 D1-D3 
9 months -0.070  -0.058  -0.047  -0.024  
 (0.13) (0.25) (0.39) (0.00) 
12 months -0.110  -0.096  -0.081  -0.029  
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.13) (0.00) 
15 months -0.123  -0.105  -0.088  -0.034  
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.08) (0.00) 
 72 
 
Table6: Geographic distance and the investor sentiment effect (excluding firms 
located in financial center) 
 
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment 
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the 
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which 
are shown in Equation (4) after excluding firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or 
Shenzhen. I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted portfolio formed 
on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns of local firms and 
Nonlocal those of nonlocal firms. Local–Nonlocal represents the difference in the 
average stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A uses 250 miles as the 
cutting boundary for local and nonlocal firms, Panel B uses 100 miles and Panel C 100 
kilometers; D1 represents the average returns of firms located within a 100-kilometer 
radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen while D3 shows the average returns of firms 
headquartered outside a 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, D2 
stands for the average returns of firms located between 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, 
Shanghai or Shenzhen and 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen.. 
Simulated p-values are reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the 
hypothesis that the slope coefficient β does not equal 0.  
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 250 miles as the 
local–nonlocal boundary 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.059  -0.053  -0.006  
 (0.23) (0.32) (0.11) 
12 months -0.098  -0.090  -0.008  
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) 
15 months -0.108  -0.099  -0.010  
  (0.03) (0.07) (0.13) 
 
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 miles as the 
local and nonlocal boundary 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.062  -0.054  -0.007  
 (0.20) (0.30) (0.01) 
12 months -0.101  -0.091  -0.010  
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.01) 
15 months -0.111  -0.099  -0.011  
  (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) 
 
Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 kilometers as 
the local–nonlocal boundary 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.056  -0.056  0.000  
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.93) 
12 months -0.094  -0.093  -0.001  
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.92) 
15 months -0.104  -0.102  -0.001  
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.94) 
 
Panel D: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 kilometers and 
1,000 kilometers as the boundary dividing D1, D2 and D3 
Horizon D1 D2 D3 D1-D3 
9 months -0.056  -0.058  -0.046  -0.009  
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.41) (0.08) 
12 months -0.094  -0.097  -0.081  -0.013  
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.13) (0.10) 
15 months -0.105  -0.105  -0.088  -0.016  
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) 
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Table 7: Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local and nonlocal 
firms connected to HSR lines 
 
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment 
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the 
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which 
are shown in Equation (4) for the treatment group (local and nonlocal firms that are 
connected to HSR lines). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted 
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on 
firms located within a 250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and Nonlocal 
represents the returns on firms outside these radii. Local–Nonlocal represents the 
difference in the average stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A reports 
the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the treatment group before the HSR reform 
(2003-2006). Panel B reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on treatment 
group after the HSR reform (2007-2015). Panel C reports the equal-weighted portfolio 
regression on the treatment group for the whole sample period (2003-2015). Simulated 
p-values are reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that 
the slope coefficient β does not equal 0. 
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines 
from 2003 to 2006 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local–
Nonlocal 
9 months 0.149  0.194  -0.045  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
12 months 0.104  0.144  -0.039  
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.00) 
15 months 0.016  0.036  -0.019  
  (0.94) (0.75) (0.03) 
 
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines 
from 2007 to 2015 
Horizon Local Nonlocal 
Local–
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.110  -0.115  0.005  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.42) 
12 months -0.141  -0.143  0.003  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.72) 
15 months -0.119  -0.120  0.001  
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.92) 
 
Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines 
from 2003 to 2015 
Horizon Local Nonlocal 
Local–
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.066  -0.059  -0.006  
 (0.18) (0.27) (0.51) 
12 months -0.105  -0.097  -0.007  
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.54) 
15 months -0.116  -0.108  -0.007  
  (0.02) (0.06) (0.65) 
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Table 8: Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local and nonlocal 
firms unconnected to HSR lines 
 
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment 
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the 
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which 
are shown in Equation (4) for the control group (local and nonlocal firms that are 
unconnected to HSR lines). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted 
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on 
firms located within a 250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen while 
Nonlocal stands for the average stock returns on firms headquartered outside these radii. 
Local–Nonlocal represents the differences in the average stock returns between local 
and nonlocal firms. Panel A reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the 
control group before the HSR reform (2003-2006). Panel B reports the equal-weighted 
portfolio regression on the control group after the HSR reform (2007-2015). Panel C 
reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the control group for the whole 
sample period (2003-2015). Simulated p-values are reported in parentheses and are for 
two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β does not equal 0. 
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR 
lines from 2003 to 2006 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local–
Nonlocal 
9 months 0.149  0.177  -0.028  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
12 months 0.104  0.133  -0.029  
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.00) 
15 months 0.016  0.041  -0.024  
  (0.94) (0.65) (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR 
lines from 2007 to 2015 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local–
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.110  -0.096  -0.014  
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
12 months -0.141  -0.124  -0.017  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) 
15 months -0.119  -0.098  -0.022  
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.08) 
 
Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR 
lines from 2003 to 2015 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local–
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.065  -0.041  -0.024  
 (0.18) (0.49) (0.00) 
12 months -0.104  -0.076  -0.029  
 (0.04) (0.18) (0.00) 
15 months -0.116  -0.083  -0.032  
  (0.02) (0.13) (0.01) 
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Table 9: Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local and nonlocal 
firms connected to HSR lines for subsamples 
 
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment 
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the 
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which 
are shown in Equation (4) for the treatment group (local and nonlocal firms that are 
connected to HSR lines). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted 
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on 
firms located within a 250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and Nonlocal 
represents the returns on firms outside these radii but within 1500 kilometer-radius of 
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Local–Nonlocal represents the difference in the average 
stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A reports the equal-weighted 
portfolio regression on the treatment group before the HSR reform (2003-2006). Panel 
B reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on treatment group after the HSR 
reform (2007-2015). Panel C reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the 
treatment group for the whole sample period (2003-2015). Simulated p-values are 
reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope 
coefficient β does not equal 0. 
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines 
from 2003 to 2006 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months 0.149  0.193  -0.045  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
12 months 0.105  0.144  -0.040  
 (0.09) (0.05) (0.00) 
15 months 0.017  0.035  -0.019  
  (0.94) (0.74) (0.04) 
 
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines 
from 2007 to 2015 
Horizon Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.111  -0.115  0.005  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.41) 
12 months -0.140  -0.144  0.003  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.73) 
15 months -0.119  -0.120  0.001  
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.91) 
 
Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines 
from 2003 to 2015 
Horizon Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.065  -0.059  -0.006  
 (0.17) (0.27) (0.50) 
12 months -0.104  -0.096  -0.007  
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.55) 
15 months -0.115  -0.108  -0.007  
  (0.02) (0.06) (0.64) 
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Table 10: Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local and 
nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR lines for subsamples 
 
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment 
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the 
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which 
are shown in Equation (4) for the treatment group (local and nonlocal firms that are 
connected to HSR lines). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted 
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on 
firms located within a 250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and Nonlocal 
represents the returns on firms outside these radii but within 1500 kilometer-radius of 
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Local–Nonlocal represents the difference in the average 
stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A reports the equal-weighted 
portfolio regression on the treatment group before the HSR reform (2003-2006). Panel 
B reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on treatment group after the HSR 
reform (2007-2015). Panel C reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the 
treatment group for the whole sample period (2003-2015). Simulated p-values are 
reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope 
coefficient β does not equal 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR 
lines from 2003 to 2006 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months 0.149  0.189  -0.040  
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
12 months 0.105  0.144  -0.041  
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.00) 
15 months 0.017  0.049  -0.032  
  (0.93) (0.57) (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR 
lines from 2007 to 2015 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.111  -0.100  -0.011  
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) 
12 months -0.141  -0.128  -0.013  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) 
15 months -0.119  -0.100  -0.019  
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) 
 
Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR 
lines from 2003 to 2015 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.065  -0.043  -0.023  
 (0.18) (0.48) (0.00) 
12 months -0.104  -0.079  -0.026  
 (0.04) (0.18) (0.01) 
15 months -0.116  -0.086  -0.029  
  (0.02) (0.13) (0.03) 
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Figure 2: Sentiment coefficients over time before and after HSR reform 
 
The figure shows the difference in the sentiment coefficients from Equation (4) between 
local and nonlocal firms over the 24-month period for the treatment group and the 
control group before and after the HSR reform. Dif_beta_Unconnected (dotted line) is 
the difference in the sentiment coefficients between local and nonlocal firms that are 
not connected to an HSR line over the 24-month period and Dif_beta_Connected is the 
difference between those that are connected to HSR lines over the 24-month period. 
Panel A shows the difference in sentiment coefficients between the treatment and 
control groups from 2003 to 2006; Panel B shows the difference in sentiment 
coefficients between the treatment and control groups from 2007 to 2015. 
 
Panel A: Sentiment coefficients before the HSR reform, 2003-2006 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sentiment coefficients after the HSR reform, 2007-2015 
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Table 11: Travel time and the investor sentiment effect 
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment 
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the 
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which 
are shown in Equation (4). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted 
portfolio formed on the travel times by train, plane and toll road. For Panel A, Local 
represents the average stock returns on firms headquartered in cities within a 12-hour 
travel time of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen while Nonlocal represents the returns on 
firms headquartered in cities more than 12-hours away from Beijing, Shanghai or 
Shenzhen. For Panel B, Local represents the average stock returns on firms 
headquartered in cities within a 4-hour travel time of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen 
while Nonlocal represents the returns on firms headquartered in cities more than 12-
hours away from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Local–Nonlocal represents the 
difference in the average stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Simulated p-
values are reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the 
slope coefficient β does not equal 0. 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 12 hours as local-
nonlocal boundary  
 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.155  -0.140  -0.014  
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
12 months -0.242  -0.226  -0.016  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
15 months -0.260  -0.241  -0.019  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 4 hours as local 
group and 12 hours as nonlocal group 
 
Horizon 
Local Nonlocal 
Local-
Nonlocal 
9 months -0.156  -0.140  -0.015  
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
12 months -0.242  -0.226  -0.016  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
15 months -0.260  -0.241  -0.019  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
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Table 12: Stock market participation and the investor sentiment effect 
 
This table presents the results of the effect of the stock market participation rate on the 
investor sentiment effect. Panel A summarizes the top three provinces in terms of stock 
market participation rates from 2003 to 2014. Panel B summarizes the regressions of 
portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index (SENT), the market earnings-to-
price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–
French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which are shown in Equation (4). I report the 
coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted portfolio formed on the stock market 
participation rate. High represents the average stock returns on firms headquartered in 
provinces with a top three stock market participation rate while Low represents the 
returns on firms headquartered in other provinces. High–Low represents the differences 
in the average stock returns between high and low stock market participation firms. 
Simulated p-values are reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the 
hypothesis that the slope coefficient β does not equal 0. 
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Panel A: Top three stock market participation provinces 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 
Province MPR Province MPR Province MPR Province MPR 
Shanghai 45.01% Shanghai 46.83% Shanghai 43.79% Shanghai 44.31% 
Beijing 23.08% Beijing 24.15% Beijing 24.69% Beijing 20.87% 
Tianjin 15.12% Tianjin 15.20% Tianjin 15.09% Tianjin 14.01% 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
Province MPR Province MPR Province MPR Province MPR 
Shanghai 68.44% Shanghai 73.53% Shanghai 80.90% Shanghai 74.06% 
Beijing 34.86% Beijing 38.01% Beijing 45.01% Beijing 46.77% 
Guangdong 18.82% Guangdong 20.66% Guangdong 23.43% Guangdong 23.85% 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Province MPR Province MPR Province MPR Province MPR 
Shanghai 75.08% Shanghai 75.04% Shanghai 74.95% Shanghai 78.03% 
Beijing 48.22% Beijing 48.22% Beijing 48.33% Beijing 49.62% 
Guangdong 25.40% Guangdong 25.93% Guangdong 26.46% Guangdong 27.57% 
 
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on high market participate portfolios and low market 
participate portfolios 
 
Horizon High Low High-Low 
9 months -0.073  -0.054  -0.019  
 (0.13) (0.3) (0.00) 
12 months -0.115  -0.091  -0.023  
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.00) 
15 months -0.127  -0.101  -0.027  
  (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) 
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Table 13: Summary statistics on stock recommendations 
 
This table presents the summary statistics on the number of analysts’ stock 
recommendations from 2003 to 2015. Panel A reports the univariate analysis in terms 
of the quarterly number of recommendations on local and nonlocal firms (250 miles as 
the geographical cutting boundary). Panel B summarizes the yearly number of stock 
recommendations.  
 
Panel A: The number of analysts for local and nonlocal firms  
 
Variables  Obs Mean 
Number of analysts for local firms 46,238 2.128  
Number of analysts for nonlocal firms 35,500 1.905  
Local-nonlocal  0.223*** 
t-statistic   8.61 
 
Panel B: The number of stock recommendations by year 
 
Year Strongbuy Buy Hold or worse All 
2003 303 641 1011 1955 
2004 523 1546 1006 3075 
2005 2062 5710 4291 12063 
2006 4664 8795 3160 16619 
2007 7108 10804 2343 20255 
2008 15921 31751 11694 59366 
2009 15773 38297 12900 66970 
2010 30448 46610 8688 85746 
2011 40009 55712 7940 103661 
2012 33131 48906 7688 89725 
2013 33810 46133 5710 85653 
2014 36882 40347 3932 81161 
2015 37521 28671 2251 68443 
          
Total 258155 363923 72614 694692 
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Table 14: Number of analyst recommendations and the investor sentiment effect 
 
This table presents the full results on the relation between the number of analyst 
recommendations and investor sentiment. Panel A presents the summary statistics for 
the variables in the analysis. “Strong buy” is the number of quarterly “Strong buy” 
recommendations, “Buy” is the number of quarterly “Buy” recommendations, “Hold or 
worse” is the sum of quarterly “Netural”, “Hold” and “Sell” recommendations, and “All” 
is the total stock recommendations issued in the corresponding quarter. SENT is the 
average monthly investor sentiment index in a quarter. Local is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the firm is identified as a local firm and 0 otherwise. GDPCHG is the 
seasonally adjusted percentage change in GDP in a quarter, PASTMARKET is the gross 
returns on the value-weighted market index over the 12 months prior to the beginning 
of a quarter and MARKETVOL is the volatility of gross market returns during the 12 
months prior to the beginning of a quarter. Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s asset 
value. BTM is the book-to-market ratio. RET is a firm’s gross market returns over the 
past 12 months and RETVOL stands for the standard deviation in each firm’s monthly 
returns over the past 12 months. CAPEX is the lagged capital expenditure as a 
percentage of total assets and ROA is the lagged return on assets. LOSS equals 1 for 
firms that report a loss in any of the previous four quarters and 0 otherwise. ISSUE 
equals 1 if the firm issues equity in that quarter and 0 otherwise. Coverage is the number 
of analysts following a firm in a certain quarter. IOHLD is the institutional ownership. 
Panel B reports the regression results for the baseline model in Equation (5). Panel C 
reports the probit regression result for the first-stage of the Heckman two-stage 
procedure. Panel D reports the regression result for Equation (7). Panel E presents the 
reaction of stock prices to different types of stock recommendations on local and 
nonlocal firms, respectively.  
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Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
Variable N mean sd p25 p50 p75 
Strongbuy 81738 3.16  8.46  0.00  0.00  3.00  
Buy 81738 4.45  9.17  0.00  0.00  4.00  
Holdorworse 81738 0.89  2.80  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Coverage 81738 2.03  3.67  0.00  0.00  2.00  
IOHLD 81738 2.28  4.91  0.00  0.01  1.98  
BTM 81738 0.98  0.84  0.43  0.72  1.24  
ROA 81738 0.02  0.04  0.00  0.02  0.04  
CAPEX 81738 0.06  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.09  
RETVOL 81738 0.12  0.06  0.08  0.11  0.15  
RET 81738 0.21  0.54  -0.16  0.08  0.51  
Size 81738 21.98  1.04  21.26  21.87  22.60  
ISSUE 81738 0.01  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  
LOSS 81738 0.25  0.43  0.00  0.00  0.00  
PASTMARKET 81738 0.13  0.41  -0.11  0.03  0.38  
MARKETVOL 81738 0.07  0.03  0.05  0.06  0.08  
GDPCHG 81738 0.03  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.04  
SENT 81738 -0.02  0.88  -0.68  -0.16  0.38  
Local 81738 0.57  0.50  0.00  1.00  1.00  
Local*SENT 81738 -0.01  0.66  -0.22  0.00  0.00  
 
Panel B: Regressions analysis for number of stock recommendations and investor 
sentiment 
 
VARIABLES Strongbuy Buy Holdorworse 
        
SENT -0.040 -0.074 -0.016 
 (-0.59) (-1.02) (-0.57) 
Local 40.930*** 26.976*** 0.061 
 (7.17) (6.98) (0.06) 
Local*SENT 0.114** -0.053 -0.022 
 (2.45) (-1.07) (-1.07) 
BTM 0.751*** 0.418*** -0.042** 
 (15.31) (9.36) (-2.32) 
ROA 10.400*** 13.624*** -0.323 
 (13.11) (16.27) (-1.10) 
CAPEX 1.135*** 2.173*** 0.811*** 
 (2.65) (4.64) (4.42) 
Size 3.137*** 3.191*** 0.446*** 
 (43.52) (49.08) (20.20) 
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IOHLD 0.269*** 0.253*** -0.032*** 
 (27.83) (26.17) (-11.41) 
RETVOL 0.095 1.665*** 1.259*** 
 (0.20) (3.18) (5.67) 
RET 0.729*** 0.001 -0.477*** 
 (9.00) (0.01) (-13.92) 
ISSUE 0.701* 0.589* 0.081 
 (1.90) (1.72) (0.79) 
LOSS 0.084 0.018 -0.081*** 
 (1.64) (0.32) (-3.28) 
PASTMARKET -1.469*** -0.923*** -0.023 
 (-8.68) (-5.01) (-0.32) 
MARKETVOL -8.915*** -17.290*** 0.538 
 (-4.13) (-7.26) (0.65) 
GDPCHG 12.276*** 16.407*** -4.084*** 
 (4.50) (5.05) (-3.04) 
    
Observations 81,738 81,738 81,738 
R-squared 0.474 0.507 0.280 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460 0.494 0.261 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Panel C: Heckman two-stage regression (Stage one) 
 
VARIABLES treated 
  
NUM 0.001*** 
 (7.02) 
SENT 0.072*** 
 (5.30) 
Local 0.051*** 
 (4.87) 
Local*SENT 0.007 
 (0.57) 
BTM 0.145*** 
 (21.81) 
ROA 6.374*** 
 (32.13) 
CAPEX 2.518*** 
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 (29.15) 
Size 0.603*** 
 (83.97) 
IOHLD 0.098*** 
 (39.77) 
RETVOL -1.209*** 
 (-10.84) 
RET 0.305*** 
 (17.07) 
ISSUE 0.126* 
 (1.81) 
LOSS -0.233*** 
 (-16.81) 
PASTMARKET -0.586*** 
 (-21.34) 
MARKETVOL 2.469*** 
 (9.65) 
GDPCHG -5.499*** 
 (-14.40) 
  
Observations 81,738 
Pseudo R2 0.308 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Panel D: Heckman two-stage regression (Stage two) 
 
VARIABLES Strongbuy Buy Holdorworse 
    
SENT 0.438*** 0.259*** -0.035 
 (6.49) (3.55) (-1.25) 
Local 37.253*** 24.410*** 0.208 
 (6.98) (6.61) (0.22) 
Local*SENT 0.097** -0.065 -0.021 
 (2.11) (-1.32) (-1.04) 
BTM 1.741*** 1.109*** -0.082*** 
 (30.03) (21.58) (-4.23) 
ROA 57.392*** 46.421*** -2.209*** 
 (34.92) (29.83) (-4.31) 
CAPEX 19.608*** 15.066*** 0.070 
 (28.62) (22.30) (0.28) 
Size 7.067*** 5.933*** 0.289*** 
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 (49.16) (48.24) (7.39) 
IOHLD 0.601*** 0.485*** -0.045*** 
 (39.39) (35.05) (-11.12) 
RETVOL -9.426*** -4.980*** 1.641*** 
 (-17.19) (-8.57) (6.85) 
RET 3.211*** 1.733*** -0.576*** 
 (29.62) (15.95) (-14.24) 
ISSUE 1.715*** 1.296*** 0.041 
 (4.75) (3.79) (0.39) 
LOSS -2.252*** -1.612*** 0.013 
 (-29.69) (-21.55) (0.41) 
PASTMARKET -5.314*** -3.606*** 0.131* 
 (-25.97) (-17.21) (1.66) 
MARKETVOL 11.158*** -3.280 -0.268 
 (5.07) (-1.35) (-0.31) 
GDPCHG -27.105*** -11.079*** -2.504* 
 (-9.29) (-3.27) (-1.78) 
invmills1 11.423*** 7.973*** -0.458*** 
 (36.45) (29.29) (-5.32) 
    
Observations 81,738 81,738 81,738 
R-squared 0.504 0.520 0.281 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.491 0.507 0.262 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Panel E: Market reaction to different types of stock recommendations 
 
Variables No. of Obs. Local Nonlocal Difference 
Strongbuy  52,326 1.73%*** 1.49%*** 0.24%*** 
Buy 70,770 1.07%*** 0.92%*** 0.14%*** 
Holdorworse 18,013 -0.18%*** -0.31%*** 0.13%*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 15. A comparison of institutional ownership 
 
This table compares the quarterly institutional ownership between firms. Specifically, 
Panel A reports the comparison of institutional ownership between local and nonlocal 
firms; Panel B summarizes the comparison of institutional ownership between firms 
with above- and below-sample median sentiment index and between local and nonlocal 
firms. 250 miles27 is the geographic cutting boundary for local and nonlocal firms.  
 
Panel A: Comparison of institutional holding on local and nonlocal firms  
 
Geography   
Local 2.33  
  
Nonlocal 2.32  
    
 0.40[0.69] 
 
Panel B: Comparison of institutional holding on local and nonlocal firms, high-
sentiment and low-sentiment period. 
 
Geography\Sentiment 
Sent<=Sample 
Median 
Sent>Sample 
Median t_Value[p_value] 
Local 2.00  2.66  Row test: 
   13.96***[0.00] 
Nonlocal 1.95  2.70  Row test: 
      13.15***[0.00] 
Diagonal test: Column test: Column test: Diagonal test: 
13.71***[0.00] 0.98[0.33] 0.60[0.55] 13.38***[0.00] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
27 The results are robust when I use 100 miles, 100 kilometers as geographic cutting boundary. 
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Table 16: Gross domestic product and investor sentiment effect 
 
This table reports the results for the effect of GDP on the investor sentiment effect. 
Panel A presents the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index 
(SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation 
rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML) which are 
shown in Equation (4). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted 
portfolio formed on the nominal value of GDP at the province level. High refers to the 
average stock returns on firms headquartered in provinces with top ten GDP while Low 
refers to the returns on firms headquartered in other provinces. High–Low represents 
the differences in the average stock returns between high GDP and low GDP firms. 
Panel B shows the same regression results as Panel A but without firms located in 
Beijing, Shanghai or Guangdong. Simulated p-values are reported in parentheses and 
are for two-sided tests for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β does not equal 0. 
 
Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on high GDP portfolios and low GDP portfolios 
 
Horizons High Low High-Low 
9 months -0.059  -0.061  0.002  
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.64) 
12 months -0.097  -0.100  0.002  
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.55) 
15 months -0.108  -0.109  0.001  
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.65) 
 
Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on high GDP portfolios and low GDP portfolios (after 
excluding firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or Guangdong) 
 
Horizons High Low High-Low 
9 months -0.054  -0.056  0.003  
 (0.28) (0.29) (0.57) 
12 months -0.090  -0.093  0.003  
 (0.08) (0.1) (0.58) 
15 months -0.100  -0.099  0.000  
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.81) 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
CEFD The value-weighted average difference between the net asset value (NAV) per share and market price of each closed-end fund share, divided by the net asset value (NAV) per share 
TURN  The natural log of the ratio of the amount of monthly market turnover trading to the aggregate market value, detrended by the 5-month moving average 
NIPO  The number of monthly initial public offerings  
RIPO  The average market-adjusted first-day returns of initial public offerings 
Eshare  The ratio of equity issues to total equity issues and bank borrowing. 
DSG The growth rate of savings deposits controlling for the growth of money supply (M0) 
NACT The natural log number of new investment accounts (in thousands) 
IPG The growth in industrial production  
CG The consumption growth rate 
sentiment The sentiment index 
EP The market level earnings-to-price ratio 
RF The risk-free rate, measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed deposits 
INFL The monthly inflation rate  
ExRET The excess return on the market portfolio of stocks 
SMB  The difference between average returns on the small-stock portfolio and average returns on the large-stock portfolio per month 
HML The difference between average returns on the high-BE/ME portfolio and average returns on the low-BE/ME portfolio per month 
cr_eq_f`i' The i-month future market return 
Local The average returns of firms located within certain radius (250miles, 100miles or 100kilometers) of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen in Table 5 to Table 10 and in Table 15 
Local  The average returns on firms headquartered in cities with less travel times from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen in Table 11 
Local  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is identified as a local firm and 0 otherwise in Table 14 
Nonlocal The average returns of firms located outside certain radius (250miles, 100miles or 100kilometers) of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen in Table 5 to Table 10 and in Table 15 
Nonlocal The average returns on firms headquartered in cities with more travel times from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen in Table 11 
D1 The average returns of firms located within a 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen 
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D2 The average returns of firms located between 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen 
D3 The average returns of firms located outside a 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen 
High The average returns on firms located in provinces with top three stock market participation rate/top ten GDP 
Low The average returns on firms located in provinces with low (lower than top three) stock market participation rate/ low GDP ( lower than top ten) 
MPR The provincial-level total stock accounts divided by the year-end population in that province 
Strongbuy The number of quarterly “Strong buy” recommendations 
Buy The number of quarterly “Buy” recommendations 
Holdorworse The sum of quarterly “Netural”, “Hold” and “Sell” recommendations 
Coverage The number of analysts following a firm in a quarter 
IOHLD The institutional ownership in a quarter 
BTM The book-to-market ratio 
ROA The lagged return on assets 
CAPEX The lagged capital expenditure as a percentage of total assets 
RETVOL The standard deviation in each firm’s monthly returns over the past 12 months 
RET A firm’s gross market returns over the past 12 months 
Size The natural logarithm of a firm’s asset value 
ISSUE A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm issues equity in that quarter and 0 otherwise 
LOSS A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that report a loss in any of the previous four quarters and 0 otherwise 
PASTMARKET The gross returns on the value-weighted market index over the 12 months prior to the beginning of a quarter 
MARKETVOL The volatility of gross market returns during the 12 months prior to the beginning of a quarter 
GDPCHG The seasonally adjusted percentage change in GDP in a quarter 
SENT The average monthly investor sentiment index in a quarter 
 
